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Abstract
The rapid development and convergence of computing technologies and communications
create the need to connect diverse devices with different operating systems and protocols.
This resulted in numerous challenges to provide seamless integration of a large amount of
heterogeneous physical devices or entities. Hence, Software-defined Networks (SDN), as an
emerging paradigm, has the potential to revolutionize the legacy network management and
accelerate the network innovation by centralizing the control and visibility over the network.
However, security issues remain a significant concern and impede SDN from being widely
adopted.
To identity the threats that inherent to SDN, we conducted a deep analysis in 3 dimensions
to evaluate the security of the proposed architecture. In this analysis, we summarized 9
security principles for the SDN controller and checked the security of the current well-known
SDN controllers with those principles. We found that the SDN controllers, namely ONOS
and OpenContrail, are relatively two more secure controllers according to our conducted
methodology. We also found the urgent need to integrate the mechanisms such as connection
verification, application-based access control, and data-to-control traffic control for securely
implementing a SDN controller. In this thesis, we focus on the app-to-control threats, which
could be partially mitigated by the application-based access control. As the malicious network
application can be injected to the SDN controller through external APIs, i.e., RESTful APIs, or
internal APIs, including OSGi bundles, Java APIs, Python APIs etc. In this thesis, we discuss
how to protect the SDN controller against the malicious operations caused by the network
application injection both through the external APIs and the internal APIs.
6We proposed a security-enhancing layer (SE-layer) to protect the interaction between the
control plane and the application plane in an efficient way with the fine-grained access control,
especially hardening the SDN controller against the attacks from the external APIs. This
SE-layer is implemented in the RESTful-based northbound interfaces in the SDN controller
and hence it is controller-independent for working with most popular controllers, such as
OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, Ryu and POX, with low deployment complexity. No
modifications of the source codes are required in their implementations while the overall security
of the SDN controller is enhanced. Our developed prototype I, Controller SEPA, protects well
the SDN controller with network application authentication, authorization, application isolation,
and information shielding with negligible latency from less than 0.1% to 0.3% for protecting
SDN controller against the attacks via external APIs, i.e, RESTful APIs. We developed also
the SE-layer prototype II, called Controller DAC, which makes dynamic the access control.
Controller DAC can detect the API abuse from the external APIs by accounting the network
application operation with latency less than 0.5%.
Thanks to this SE-layer, the overall security of the SDN controller is improved but with
a latency of less than 0.5%. However, the SE-layer can isolate the network application to
communicate the controller only through the RESTful APIs. However, the RESTful APIs is
insufficient in the use cases which needs the real-time service to deliver the OpenFlow messages.
Therefore, we proposed a security-enhancing architecture for securing the network application
deployment through the internal APIs in SDN, with a new SDN architecture dubbed SENAD. In
SENAD, we split the SDN controller in: (1) a data plane controller (DPC), and (2) an application
plane controller (APC) and adopt the message bus system as the northbound interface instead
of the RESTful APIs for providing the service to deliver the OpenFlow messages in real-time.
The role of the DPC is dedicated for interpreting the network rules into OpenFlow entries and
maintaining the communication between the control plane and the data plane. We then secure by
design the APC, which plays the role as the runtime of the networks applications. In APC, the
network applications are deployed in the secure environment including authentication, access
control, resource isolation, and applications monitoring. We show that this approach can easily
shield against any deny of service, caused by the resource exhaustion attack or the malicious
7command injection. Furthermore, we also implemented a network application to detect an
OpenFlow specific attack, called priority-bypassing attack, for evaluating the feasibility of
the SENAD architecture. The evaluation of this architecture shows that a packet_in message
takes around 5 ms to be delivered from the data plane to the network applications on the long
range. Thanks to the SE-layer and SENAD architecture, the SDN controller can protect against
the malicious operations from the network application through both the external APIs and the
internal APIs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to SDN
As a result of various Internet services, computer networks has been recognized as a critical role
in modern life over the past half century. The rapid development and convergence of computing
technologies and communication create the need to connect diverse devices with different
operating systems and protocols. The seamless integration of a large amount of heterogeneous
physical devices or entities poses many challenges, and how to establish a secure, accurate,
and reliable communication channel between these different service infrastructure involve
many non-trivial issues. Especially, it is challenging to correctly and effectively implement
management tasks for these networks. As the control plane is coupled with the data plane
in today’s network, the control plane on each device exchanges information with each other,
decides how the packets should be processed on the device, and configures the data plane as
depicting in Figure 1.1 [45]. Since the control plane is distributed on the devices, it does not
have a global view of the network and cannot make good network-wide decisions. Operators
spend tremendous effort and time on configuring network devices. Managing these networks
to provide reliable and secure network services is a central problem for computer networking
research. Therefore, Software-defined networks(SDN) as an emerging paradigm has the
potential to revolutionize legacy network management by centralizing the control plane [143].
Figure 1.2 is the high-level view of the SDN architecture [45]. This thesis is intended to develop
a suite of effective approaches to achieve a secure and reliable SDN architecture. We introduce
first the SDN architecture in this chapter. In Chapter 2, we conduct a 3-dimensional analysis
on the security of the SDN controller. By following this analysis, we found the urgent need
to secure the data exchange between the control plane and the application plane. Hence, we
propose a security-enhancing layer in Chapter 3 and secure the network application deployment
in Chapter 4. The conclusion will be given in Chapter 5.
2 Introduction to SDN
1.1 The architecture of Software-defined Networks
Software-defined networks(SDN) refers to a network architecture where the forwarding state
in the data plane is managed by a remotely controlled plane decoupled from the former. This
architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network
control to become directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for
applications and network services. The basic components in the architecture SDN consists of
three layers and three interfaces are as following.
1.1.1 The data plane
The data plane consists of the networking appliances which forwards the packets. The data
plane enables data transfer to and from end hosts, handling multiple conversations through
multiple protocols, and manages conversations with remote peers. SDN decouples the data
and control planes and implements the control plane in software instead [21]. Examples of
SDN/OpenFlow-enabled switch implementations include Switch Light, Open vSwitch, Pica8,
Pantou, and XorPlus, etc [45].
1.1.2 The control plane
The control plane, namely the SDN controller, makes decisions about where traffic is sent.
The control plane in the SDN architecture can therefore be seen as the "network brain". The
main function of the controller should provide a centralized way to manage the networks and
exchange the data between the data plane and the network application. Moving the control
plane to software allows dynamic access and administration. A network administrator can
shape traffic from a centralized control console without having to touch individual switches
and change any network switch’s rules or configuration [20]. It exists more than twenty SDN
Fig. 1.1 Legacy network architecture
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Fig. 1.2 SDN architecture
controllers in the market [125]. Here, we enumerate the open source and active SDN controllers
which are related to our work in this thesis.
Floodlight. Project Floodlight is a popular SDN controller for the OpenFlow protocol
written in Java. Floodlight supports two kinds of applications: Module applications and
RESTful applications. Module applications are applications that are implemented in Java, and
compiled together with the controller. These applications run as a part of the floodlight code,
in the same process. REST applications are applications that use Floodlight’s RESTful API
to communicate with the controller. Using this API, information can be obtained from the
controller, and route information can be sent to the controller. The RESTful API is more limited
than the module application API in the sense of the interaction with the controller, but it can be
used to avoid the malicious network application injection by decoupling from the controller via
TCP/IP communication [35].
Ryu. Ryu is a highly modular, small SDN controller written in Python. The core of Ryu
is smaller than other controllers. Ryu provides software components with well defined API
that make it easy for developers to create new network management and control applications.
Ryu supports various protocols for managing network devices, such as OpenFlow, Netconf,
OF-config [94]. This controller is highly recommended after the analysis based on Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) proposed by [111].
OpenDaylight. The core of the OpenDaylight controller is the Model-Driven Service
Abstraction Layer (MD-SAL). In OpenDaylight, underlying network devices and network
applications are all represented as objects, or models, whose interactions are processed within
the SAL. This is achieved by the YANG models which provides generalized descriptions of a
device or application’s capabilities without requiring either to know the specific implementation
details of the other. Even more, OpenDaylight includes support for a broad set of protocols
in SDN platform – OpenFlow, OVSDB, NETCONF, BGP and many more – that improve
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programmability of modern networks and solve a range of user needs. OpenDaylight is based
on Kafka container, which enables the module can be turn on and off dynamically without
interfering other modules [101]
ONOS. ONOS is a native distributed SDN controllers for forming the controller cluster.
The controller cluster provide high controller deployment scalability and avoid the one-single-
point-of-failure problem in SDN. An ONOS cluster can be scaled as needed to provide the
amount of control plane capacity needed. If more switches are added to the network, new
instances of ONOS can be easily added into the cluster without service interruption. Like
OpenDaylight, ONOS also uses the Apache Karaf framework [95].
OpenContrail. OpenContrail is built using standards-based protocols and provides the
necessary components for network virtualization. It simplifies especially the creation and
management of virtual networks. In addition, it focuses on addressing the challenges of large-
scale managed environments, including multi-tenancy, network segmentation, network and
access control etc [73].
Other controllers. The most popular are NOX [86] [93] and POX[15]. NOX is the original
controller for OpenFlow, developed alongside the OpenFlow protocol. As such, it attracted
many research attention. POX is a sibling of NOX, written in Python, meant to be more modern.
Open Mul is an OpenFlow controller written in C, designed for performance and reliability.
They claim this controller is ideal for "mission-critical" environments [78].
1.1.3 The application plane
The application plane is the set of applications that leverage the functions offered by the
northbound interface to implement network control and operation logic. This includes applica-
tions such as routing, firewall, ACL, load balancers, monitoring, intrusion detection system
(IDS), scan detector, DDoS attack mitigator and so forth (refer to Figure 1.2) [38] [113] [128]
[131]. Essentially, a network application defines the policies, which are ultimately translated
to southbound-specific instructions that program the behavior of the forwarding devices. For
example, the IDS network application can trace network-wide traffic information, user mi-
gration, and packet payload, etc. If the IDS application recognizes malware traffic, it could
automatically isolate those packets before they infect the network. However, the deployment of
the network application still remains many security issues.
1.1.4 The southbound interfaces
The southbound interfaces(or APIs) in the SDN architecture are used to communicate between
the SDN controller and the network devices on the data plane. The southbound interfaces can
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be open or proprietary. It facilitates efficient control over the network and enables the SDN
controller to dynamically make changes according to real-time demands and needs. OpenFlow,
which was developed by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF), is the probably most well-
known southbound interface. It is an industry standard that defines the way the SDN controller
interacts with the forwarding plane to make adjustments to the network. With OpenFlow, entries
can be added and removed to the internal flow-table of switches and potentially routers to make
the network more responsive to real-time traffic demands [124]. While OpenFlow is not the
only one available or in development, there are other southbound interface proposals such
as ForCES, Open vSwitch Database (OVSDB), POF, OpFlex, OpenState, revised open-flow
library (ROFL), hardware abstraction layer (HAL), and programmable abstraction of data
path (PAD) [45]. As OpenFlow is the most well-known and popular southbound interface, we
discuss the OpenFlow-based SDN in this thesis.
1.1.5 The northbound interfaces
The northbound interfaces (APIs) are used to communicate between the SDN controller and
the network applications running over the network. The northbound interfaces can be used to
facilitate innovation and enable automation of the network to align with the needs of different
applications by benefiting the northbound programmability. However, the northbound interfaces
are arguably the most critical APIs in the SDN environment, since the value of SDN is tied
to the innovative applications. The northbound interfaces must support a wide variety of
applications because one size will likely not fit all. For example, network applications could be
optimized via the northbound interface to develop load balancers, firewalls or other network
services. The northbound interfaces are also used to integrate the SDN controller with the
NFV orchestrator or cloud system like Puppet, Chef, Ansible and OpenStack. This is why the
northbound interfaces are currently the most nebulous component in a SDN environment. A
variety of possible interfaces exists for SDN northbound interfaces like RESTful APIs, Java
APIs, Python APIs or message queue etc [123].
1.1.6 The westbound/eastbound interfaces
The boundary of westbound/eastbound interfaces is not yet definite. In general, these two
interfaces are used for enabling the communication between different SDN or non-SDN
domains. The westbound interface serves as an information conduit between SDN control
planes and different network domains driven by different SDN controllers. It allows the
exchange of network state information to influence routing decisions of each controller, but
at the same time enables the seamless setup of network flows across multiple domains. The
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eastbound interface communicates the control planes with the non-SDN domains. In this way,
both domains should ideally appear to be fully compatible to each other. For example, the SDN
domain should be able to use the routing protocol deployed between non-SDN domains [82].
1.2 Conclusion
The seamless integration of a large amount of heterogeneous physical devices or entities poses
many challenges, and how to establish a secure, accurate, and reliable communication channel
between these different service infrastructures involve many non-trivial issues. Fortunately,
SDN as an emerging paradigm revolutionizes legacy network management by providing a
centralized way to control the network. The SDN architecture includes three main layers,
which are the data plane, the control plane, and the application plane, and three interfaces(or
APIs) for the communication between different layers, which are the southbound interfaces,
the northbound interfaces, and the westbound/eastbound interfaces. The data plane consists of
the network devices for forwarding the network packets according to the rule flows enforced
from the control plane. The control plane, namely the SDN controller, functions as a network
operating system, can load different operation logics as the network application for enabling
network intelligent. The communication between the data plane and the control plane is the
southbound interface. The famous one is OpenFlow protocol. The interface between the control
plane and the application are called northbound interface for enabling the SDN controller
become programmable. The westbound/eastbound interfaces are not yet definite, but in general,
these two interfaces are used for communicating different SDN or non-SDN domains. However,
the security issues remain a major concern for SDN to being widely deployed. Hence, we
intend to develop effective approaches for achieving a secure and reliable environment for SDN
in this thesis. In the following chapters, we will conduct a security analysis for exploiting the
vulnerabilities of the SDN controller. Based on this analysis, we propose a security-enhancing
layer(SE-layer) to secure the interaction between the network application and the controller
with low deployment complexity and low latency. A novel SDN architecture, SENAD, for
securing network application deployment is also introduced. This approach can protect the
SDN controller effectively against the DoS attack caused by resource exhaustion attack, code
injection and command injection.
Chapter 2
3D Analysis on the Security of SDN
Controller
In this chapter, we conduct a comprehensive 3-dimensional security analysis of a SDN controller
and resume the nine security principles identified in this chapter. Finally, we evaluate the
security implementations with the security principles on the current SDN controllers.
2.1 Motivation and background
SDN is as susceptible to attacks as traditionally managed networks. A long and continuous
series of attacks have revealed many areas of network vulnerability. The SDN controller is
key to any software-defined network and offers attackers a target not present in earlier network
technologies [117]. Clearly, any successful attack on the controller will halt or disrupt network
operations [44]. To address this problem, some researchers have proposed to harden the
SDN control plane. For example, FortNOX [109] hardens the kernel of the SDN controller
(NOX) to avoid malicious rule injection from the application plane. Extending FortNOX,
SE-Floodlight [110] enhances the security of the overall control plane through authentication,
role authorization and network application operation auditing. Rosemary [130] isolates the
network application from the control plane via inter-process communication (IPC), which
enables the SDN controller to be immune from resource exhaustion attacks. Moreover, the
distributed controllers have also been proposed for providing a more scalable control plane,
such as ONOS [95], Onix [139], Kandoo [133] and the three levels controller architecture for
IoT (Internet of Things)[48]. Moreover, a distributed architecture brings new challenges for
data consistency between controllers [42]. However, the SDN controller remains vulnerable
to many threats, such as data inconsistency, OpenFlow messages flooding, topology spoofing,
8 3D Analysis on the Security of SDN Controller
and malicious scanning, etc. Although a number of surveys on SDN/OpenFlow security also
precede this analysis such as [45], [121], [75], [59], [122], [142], and [118], but none of them
provides a comprehensive study on the security of the SDN controller. For example, [59]
adopts STRIDE to evaluate the security of SDN. Conversely, [114] uses STRIDE to evaluate
the security of the southbound protocol OpenFlow. [118] presents a survey of the hybrid SDN
models by analyzing their techniques, inter-paradigm coexistence and interaction mechanisms.
[99], proposed by Open Networking Foundation (ONF), includes a coarse-grained security
analysis for the SDN controller with the STRIDE model. Here, we conduct a 3-dimensional,
fine-grained and controller-specific security analysis. Based on [99], [100] ONF introduces 31
security requirements for the SDN controller without detailing the use cases. In our work, we
summarize to nine security principles the identified requirements from the listed attacks. [98]
proposes eight principles to secure SDN, specifically securing OpenFlow and the data plane
of SDN. [111] uses a feature-based decision making template to compare and identify SDN
controllers. [30] compares and evaluates the two controllers, OpenDaylight and ONOS, in
particular their northbound interfaces, based on the use cases such as discovering the network,
adding a new network function and changing an existing function. [148] employs a quantitative
approach to analyze the security of the SDN controllers using threat/effort model. [127] is a
framework to exploit the security of SDN, specifically the control plane. As none of the above
surveys provides a specific survey for an SDN controller, we conduct here this first analysis
following 3 dimensions and evaluate the security of multiple SDN controllers. This analysis is
concluded in the Figure 2.3, showing that none of one single dimension can be used to cover
alone all the known attacks on an SDN controller. For this reason, the 3D approach can provide
a better and comprehensive analysis on the security of the SDN controller.
This chapter focuses on the points as follow:
• Conduct a specific security analysis on an SDN controller by covering 3 dimensions: (1)
the components dimension, (2) the characteristics dimension and (3) the STRIDE model.
• Conclude with and summarize countermeasures in nine principles as a necessary instruc-
tions to secure SDN controllers from the specified known attacks.
• Evaluate the security of five open-source and active SDN controllers following the nine
security principles.
2.2 First dimension
In this section, we discuss the vulnerabilities of the SDN controller in the first dimension,
which are the essential components that a SDN controller is composed of. As a matter of
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fact, the actual implementations of SDN controllers are different from each other. Fortunately,
most of the well-known SDN controllers, including OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, Ryu,
OpenContrail, NOX and POX, are implemented based on a typical architecture composed of the
key components, which are northbound interfaces (NBIs), built-in functions(i.e., core services
or basic services), computing resources, eastbound/westbound interfaces and southbound
interfaces (SBIs) as depicted in Figure 2.2 [126]. Every component will be discussed in detail
in the following sections.
With this structure, we discuss the vulnerabilities of these components layer by layer.
2.2.1 Northbound interfaces vulnerabilities
The NBIs are application-programming interfaces (e.g., RESTful APIs or native Java APIs) in
charge of the interaction between the application plane and the control plane. As the northbound
interfaces in SDN are non-standardized, they are very diverse and are more challenging to
secure. One approach is to use APIs such as general APIs (Java, C, or Python etc) [130] [43]
[149] [136] [93] [15] [87], RESTful API [95] [101] [35] [1] [73] [51], RESTCONF [101],
SDMN API [10], PANE API [31], and NVP NBAPI [139] etc. Another approach is to use
programming languages such as FML [140], Frenetic [12], Nettle [26], Procera [27], Pyretic
[40], NetKAT [36], NetCore [41], and other query-based languages [135] which specify the
security constraints to the app-to-control access. The diversity of NBIs increases the difficulty
to protect against malicious network application injection.
Code injection
A poor access control of NBIs can allow an injected malicious network application, i.e., code
injection, to call unauthorized functions. For example, ONOS allows users to dynamically
and programmatically configure various ONOS components via one of the Northbound ser-
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vices, called ComponentConfigService to enhance the configurability of ONOS. This feature
is especially useful when users need to adjust the properties of various ONOS components
(e.g., threshold values, switches to enable certain features) to fulfill different network require-
ments. Meanwhile, this feature introduces a new security threat to the control plane. A minor
change in the configuration of an ONOS component may completely change the network
behavior. Such tunable parameters should only be manipulated by the trusted entities via
ComponentConfigService. Specifically, if the PACKET_OUT_ONLY parameter value is
set to be true, the overall performance of the target network will become degraded [126]. Even
worse, the poor control of NBIs can allow malicious applications to call system level command,
e.g., via JNI, to read/write memory or to shut down the system [110].
Flow rules injection
Different from the data plane manipulation through the controller, which removes the flow rules
kept on the data plane, flow rules injection abuses NBIs to flush out the precedent flow rules,
even ones with higher priority. As most of the OF switches available on the market have limited
content-addressable memory (TCAMs) [37] [88], if the NBIs do not constrain the operations of
the network application, a malicious network application can over-insert through the controller.
The new coming flow entries will flush out and replace the existing ones, without considering
the priority of flow entries (i.e., the flow entries with lower priority can replace the flow entries
with higher priority) on data plane [145].
Flow rule manipulation
If the NBI is not secured, API can be abused to compromise the SDN controller. The malicious
network application can request to insert a large number of rules to slow down the controller
responding time. Conversely, a malicious application can also frequently delete the rules in a
switch if there are no constraints to the network application, so that every time when a new
packet comes, it would be sent to the controller to request for a rule to apply. This attack
can affect the performance of both the data plane and the control plane by consuming the
controller’s resources and degrading the overall performance [70]. In addition to the attacks
mentioned beforehand, as the control plane is decoupled from the data plane, data leakage can
happen on the NBIs. This problem will be discussed in section 2.3.5.
2.2.2 Computing resources vulnerabilities
Basic computing resources include computing capacity, memory, storage, and networking
resources. In a monolithic SDN controller implementation (e.g. RYU, POX, NOX), the
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network applications are compiled and then run as part of the controller module. While some
of the controllers like OpenDaylight and ONOS allow instantiation of network applications at
run-time without restarting the controller module by implementing the OSGi bundles, network
applications still share the same computing resources. These resources, namely memory, CPU
and networking, make the network applications inseparable from controller though the internal
APIs. In this case, a malicious network application can damage the SDN controller easily.
Resource Exhaustion
A malicious network application can create multiple memory objects, large number of threads,
an infinite loop or a non-stop growing linked list to run out the resources of the controller’s
host. These malicious operations can use up to all available system memory and all available
CPU resources. Controllers, such as NOX, Beacon, Floodlight and OpenDaylight, do not limit
memory allocations by its applications, often resulting in the controller crashing with an out
of memory error [130] [70]. In this way, the malicious application may use up all available
system resources and affect the performance of the other applications or the controller itself,
even causing a system-level DoS.
Internal storage data tampering
As a controller owns built-in storage to keep statistics record, manages flow rules or handles
packets, the storage record may be tampered once the NBI does not constrain the operation of
the network application. If a malicious application can access the controller’s data storage or
internal memory, the abuse of such trust could lead to various types of attacks impacting the
entire network. For example, the packet_in counter value is kept in the controller’s internal
storage for the usage of DoS detector or traffic monitoring. However, a malicious application
can clear packet_in counter in the internal storage to confuse the DoS detector application. The
controller also contains the network link information and flow rules in data storage, once the
app can modify these values, the topology and flow rules will be tampered. Another example is
to tamper the topology related information stored in memory. As Floodlight contains network
link information, when an application accesses the Floodlight controller, it can modify the
values in the data structure (i.e., network link information), which can easily confuse other
network applications [130].
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Fig. 2.2 The essential components of the SDN controller
2.2.3 Core services vulnerabilities
Built-in functions work as core services in a SDN controller, providing basic services to
controller, like network topology information updating, flow rules interpretation, packet handler,
network configuration and coordinating events among network applications, etc.
Core services manipulation
As core services of the SDN controller share information with all the network applications
to provide data consistency, they allow malicious applications to manipulate this services
chain. For example, applications running on OpenDaylight can easily register services or
directly call them to use their network functions. Since OpenDaylight allows applications to
change the services of other applications dynamically without constraint, an attacker can also
leverage this ability to get information about the services used by a target application and then
removes all these services so that the target application cannot use any of the services provided
by the controller. For example, ArpHandler module is a default application that manages
ARP requests and replies packets in OpenDaylight. A third party malicious application can
get access to the registered services of the target application in the Activator class through
getServiceProperties(). Then, the malicious application can call unregister() to delete
the whole services of the target application. In this case, the malicious app can successfully
unregister all the services of the ArpHandler. Consequently the ArpHandler cannot receive
any messages from the controller. Since ARP packets play the role of an initiator for network
communications, the network managed by the controller loses its functionality [126].
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Topology spoofing
The topology monitoring modules provide insight into the global network visibility; unfortu-
nately, a malicious end user can poison the network visibility provided by the SDN controller.
Faked ARP packets can be used to spoof the network view of a SDN controller, which is similar
to the ARP spoofing attack in traditional network. An attacker can generate the spoofing ARP
packet to poison the network topology of SDN controller, which causes the black hole or DoS
in data plane [83]. Similar to ARP spoofing, LLDP packets can also be used to poison the
network topology in SDN [137]. For example, a fake topology attack can be launched on an
SDN controller to poison its view of the network using detrimental packet_in messages sent by
the switches. These malicious packet_in messages could be generated by distrusted switches
themselves or by end hosts, which can send arbitrary LLDP messages spoofing connectivity
across arbitrary network links between the switches. When the controller tries to route traffic
over these phantom links, it results in packet loss, and if this link is on a critical path, it could
even lead to a blackhole. With the poisoned network visibility, the upper-layer SDN controller
may be totally misled, leading to serious hijacking, denial of service or man-in-the-middle at-
tacks [83] [137]. The SDN controllers, including OpenDaylight, Floodlight, POX, and Maestro,
can be affected due to ARP spoofing [83]. The difference between them is that the attacker
could possess a botnet or compromise more than one OF switch in the data plane for generating
the LLDP packets. This attack is OpenFlow specific and cannot succeed in the traditional
network [137].
Malicious device connection
The SDN controller also has a device management module to provide the devices information
on the data plane, such as the OF switch hardware address to identify switches. In the case
where two switches have the same identification information, the turning on of a second switch
and its connection to the controller can terminate the controller’s connection with the first
switch, favoring a connection with the new one [8]. Hence, if an attacker forges the information
of a switch, the creation and connection of this forged switch will deny the connection of the
legitimate one.
Malicious flow attack (Network-wide DoS)
The SDN controller, as a receiver, needs to verify that packets are generated from the data plane
in order to ensure the non-reputation of the flows. Unfortunately, since the SDN controller is
separated from the data plane, the data plane will typically ask the controller to obtain flow
rules when the data plane gets new network packets that it has no idea on how to handle. By
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Component Vulnerability
Northbound interface Code injection[110] [126]
Flow rule manipulation[70]
Data leakage[119]
Flow rule injection[145]
Computing resources Resource exhaustion[130][70]
Storage data tampering[130]
Core services Core services manipulation[126]
ARP spoofing[83]
LLDP spoofing[83][137]
Malicious device connection[8]
Malicious flow attack[8][131][47]
Eastbound/Westbound Faked controller connection[99]
interfaces
Southbound interface Malicious scanning[131]
packet_in messages[83][131][55][129]
f low_mod message manipulation [109][110][147]
Man-in-the-middle[76]
Table 2.1 Vulnerabilities from the essential components of SDN controller
exploiting this key property, the crafted flow requests from the data plane can mislead controller
to insert many useless flow rules in the data plane, thus making the data plane hard to store
flow rules for normal network flows (i.e., data plane resource consumption). As the data plane
is dump in SDN, the SDN controller should be secured from inserting these malicious rules
[131] [47] [8]. If the compromised switch is on a critical path in the network, it may result in
significant latency or packet drops. For example, the attacker can just repeatedly send exactly
1K flows from a host with arbitrary source addresses to ensure that flow rules never time out at
the switch and the whole data plane will be congested. This attack works for Floodlight, POX
and Maestro, which completely populate the TCAM (as they use source/destination IP pairs as
keys). This causes them to exhibit high latencies (40 - 80 ms) for any new flow rule installation
[83].
2.2.4 Eastbound and Westbound interfaces
East/westbound APIs are the interfaces required for the communication of the SDN controller
with distributed controllers or heterogeneous networks controllers (e.g., Closed-Flow [116]).
Currently, each controller implements its own east/westbound API [45]. For example, Onix
defines the interfaces as data import/export functions [139]. The advanced message queuing
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protocol (AMQP) [25] is used by DISCO [77]. ONOS adopts the Cassandra database(prototype
1) and CloudRAM (prototype 2) for synchronizing data consistency among distributed nodes
[103]. Attacker can forge a controller and intercept the communication between the data plane
and legitimate controller. Theoretically, the malicious connection can install special rules on all
forwarding devices for its malicious purposes. Taking counter falsification as another example,
an attacker can try to guess installed flow rules and, subsequently, forge packets to artificially
increase the counter. Such attacks would be especially critical for billing and load balancing
systems [99].
2.2.5 Southbound interfaces vulnerabilities
The southbound interfaces are in the charge of the communication between the data plane and
the control plane. On the data plane, a mix of OpenFlow-enabled physical devices(e.g., HP
8200 ZL series [6], Pica8 3920 [18]) and virtual devices (e.g., Open vSwitch [34], vRouter
[74]) can coexist. The southbound interfaces should allow the control platform to manage
the underlying networking devices using different protocols, such as OpenFlow, NETCONF
[61], PCEP [90], Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [13], Open vSwitch Database Management
Protocol (OVSDB)[66], SNMP [91], MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) [60] and Locator/ID
Separation Protocol (LISP) [65], etc. For example, Onix supports both the OpenFlow and
OVSDB protocols. OpenDaylight provides a service layer abstraction (SLA) that allows
several southbound protocols to communicate with the controller. OpenDaylight was designed
to support the different protocols including OpenFlow, OVSDB, NETCONF, PCEP, SNMP,
BGP, and LISP [101]. OpenFlow is one of the most popular southbound protocols. In this
paper we will discuss how the vulnerabilities of OpenFlow can be used to affect the SDN
controller (another reason is that few works discuss the security issues due to the non-OpenFlow
southbound interfaces).
packet_in message flooding
The packet_in message is a way for the switch to send a captured packet to the controller in
OpenFlow. This might happen due to an explicit action as a result of a match asking for this
behavior, from a miss in the match tables, or from a ttl(time to live) error. In this case, one of
the major threats to the controller is Denial- of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks from the data plane due to the communication bottleneck between the data
plane and the control plane, which an adversary could exploit by mounting a control plane
saturation attack that disrupts network operations. Indeed, even scanning or DoS activity can
produce more impacts in SDN than traditional networks. For instance, malicious hosts can
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mutate hosts with different IPs and MACs or forges arbitrary packet data. When the flow comes,
the OF switch will treat them as new flow and initiate a packet_in message to controller to ask
as to which flow rule to apply. Subsequently, when the controller receives too many packet_in
messages to process, it causes the normal flows to be dropped [55][83][129].
The IGMP packets can be used to generate packet_in messages because the SDN controller
maintains multicast groups as multicast trees, each group has a unique multicast IP that is used
by its members to send/receive messages. Any receivers who are interested in joining/leaving
a particular group must send IGMP messages to the controller, which are then forwarded as
packet_in messages for the maintenance of multicast groups. Malicious hosts can forge IGMP
join/leave requests to multicast groups, ultimately leading to DoS for legitimate members
existing on the data plane due to the bandwidth saturation of controller [83].
f low_mod message manipulation
f low_mod message is one of the main messages in OpenFlow, allowing the controller to
modify the state of an OF switch. This message structure contains the match fields, timeout
(idle/hard) priority and actions, etc. However, the priority attribute can bring in the priority-
bypassing attack, which will be discussed in section 2.3.6. The action attribute generates the
flow rule conflict, particularly the Rule Circuit problem [110] (Section 2.3.6). If the timeout
attribute is not well configured, i.e., the expiration time is too long for the connection, the
opportunity for the packet_in flooding attack is increased. In OpenFlow 1.0, the header fields is
12-tuple. In OpenFlow 1.4, the header fields became 44-tuple. This aggregation calls for more
packet_in messages to query the flow rule from the control plane and augments the possibility
for packet_in message flooding as well as increases the number of flow rules, saturating the
storage [114]. Similar to the vulnerabilities of northbound interfaces, the man-in-the-middle
attack can be used to target the SDN controller on the southbound interface, making TLS from
OpenFlow 1.3 optional [76]. This will be discussed in section 2.3.5. The time to process the
packet_in and packet_out messages can be used to fingerprint the SDN-based network for the
furthermore attack.
2.3 Second dimension
The SDN controller enables networking innovation to become more rapid and agile, but also
exposes new vulnerabilities to the attacker. In this section, we will discuss the characteristics
provided by the SDN controller, which bring in new security issues to the network.
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2.3.1 Open
The security of open source software is a key concern for organizations planning to implement
it as part of their software stack, particularly the SDN controller, which plays a major role on
the SDN architecture. In contrast, traditional networking appliances such as switches, routers
and intrusion detection system (IDS) are vendor specific, which are a ”black-box” and provide
limited ability for users to experiment their own networking services. On one hand, the current
mainstream SDN controllers, e.g., OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, Ryu and NOX, are open
sources and developers can develop network applications as middle-boxes that interact with the
controller and OF switches for accelerating network innovation. On the other hand, this gives
the attacker opportunity to exploit the bugs existing in SDN controller or network applications.
[127] proposes an assessment framework, called DELTA, to automate and standardize the
vulnerability identification process in SDNs. In its evaluation, DELTA reproduced 20 known
attack scenarios, across diverse SDN controller environments, including OpenDaylight, ONOS
and Floodlight, and also discovered seven novel SDN application mislead attacks. On the
one hand, the opening of the SDN controller brings in more opportunities for networking
innovations; on the other hand, it makes the SDN controller vulnerable to the attacker.
2.3.2 Programmable
Programmability is considered a major characteristic of SDN by opening northbound interfaces
as APIs to support the third-party network application to ease the deployment of new networking
functionalities. However, this makes SDN controller susceptible to the injection of the malicious
third-party applications [126]. Differing from the NBI vulnerabilities discussed in section 2.2.1,
we will emphasize on the vulnerabilities due to the co-existing of network application in this
section.
Application conflict
Consider the basic challenge of implementing two or more network applications on the same
controller. Suppose application 1 initiates a series of flow rule insertions designed to quarantine
the flows to and from a local web server. Application 2, a load-balancing network application,
redirects incoming flow requests to an available host within the local web server pool. Suppose
the web server quarantined by application 1 subsequently becomes the preferred target for new
connection flows, as this quarantined server is now the least loaded server in the pool. In this
case, should application 1 or application 2 prevail [110]? Hence, Google’s OpenFlow-based
B4 competes traffic engineering logic into a monolithic application, where the arbitration of
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Characteristics Vulnerability
Open Vulnerability exploitation[126][127]
Programmable Application conflict [110][132]
Execution chain interrupting[126][127]
Off-the-shelf Command injection[130][70]
Buggy application affection[130][99][81]
Zero-day attack[130][99]
Flow-based rule Flow rule conflict[109][110][132][57][23] [134][50]
Priority bypassing[147]
Decoupled Man-in-the-middle[76]
Data leakage[119]
Centralized packet_in flooding DoS[83][131][55][129]
Malicious flow DoS[8][131][47]
Flow rule manipulation[70]
Code injection(Controller-level DoS)[110][126]
Command injection(System-level DoS)[130][70]
Table 2.2 Vulnerabilities of characteristics provided by SDN controller
conflicting flow rules occurs fully within the application [138]. Unfortunately, the monolithic
design for a SDN controller are not extensible, reusable, secure, or reliably maintainable [130].
Execution chain interrupting
The control plane level DoS includes service chain interference between network applications
and configuration errors. As the SDN controller is programmable, it needs to mediate the execu-
tion chain amongst the network applications. Service chain interference denotes interference by
a malicious application. A chained execution of network applications may be interfered because
a malicious application may participate in a service chain and drop control messages before
other awaited applications. A malicious application may also fall in an infinite loop to stop
the chained execution of applications [127]. For example, Floodlight does not guarantee the
integrity of the message reception order of applications nor the control message. A malicious
application may leverage such vulnerability to launch an attack against the controller itself or
the network by removing the entire payload value of the message and hand the forged message
over to the next application [126].
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2.3.3 Off-the-shelf
Comparing to traditional network, SDN controller is hardware non-specific and can run on a
general purpose operating system, Linux. Unfortunately, this makes the SDN controller prone
to inherent bugs and vulnerable to its runtime, including the host operating system, compiler,
shell, or buggy application [130]. In this case, the SDN controller might be compromised due
to the zero-day attack.
Command injection
Generally speaking, a network application is only allowed to run on the SDN controller to
exchange data. However, command injection denotes the execution of a system level command
by a malicious application, which is different from code injection described in section 2.2.1
that executes functions provided by the controller. Command injection can execute a system
command. For example, the malicious network application may execute System.exit(0) , a
compiler-level command on JVM, to terminate the controller instance or sends a system-level
command to shutdown OS [130] [70].
Buggy application affection
As the SDN controller runs on a general purpose OS, which may contain other buggy ap-
plications, vulnerabilities through the privileges of other applications (e.g., script injection,
shellshock, rootkit, etc.) can be used to attack the controller. These coexisting applications on
the OS provide a back door to attack directly the controller runtime [130] [81].
Zero-day attack
As the SDN controller runs on a general-purpose OS (technically Linux), the attacker can
exploit to adversely affect computer programs and then further compromise the controller
since the exploitable bug’s existence was disclosed. The challenge to generating immunity for
the SDN controller to the zero-day attack is that the patch to fix the bug is cannot be applied
immediately. Once the patch to fix the problem cannot be applied immediately to the runtime
of controller, the whole network risks to be compromised [130].
2.3.4 Centralized
The SDN controller centralizes the control over network to ease the handling of network
situations dynamically. However, this amplifies the Denial-of-service (DoS) or Distributed
Denial-of- service (DDoS) attack [55] [129] [9].Researchers have shown that the extensive
20 3D Analysis on the Security of SDN Controller
communication between the data and control plane can potentially result in a bottleneck for
the whole system, a situation that is exacerbated when a single controller manages a set of
OpenFlow switches. Moreover, since the installation of rules on the switches is driven by the
traffic generated from network users, an attacker can exploit this behavior to attack the control
plane by flooding an OpenFlow switch with a large number of unique flows [84]. Even worse,
the control plane saturation attack can be performed through a variety of network protocols,
including TCP, UDP ICMP, or IGMP [55] [129] [85] [54].
As we discussed beforehand, the packet flooding can be launched due to OF messages
from a forged host packet or a IGMP (Section 2.2.5), data plane malicious flow (Section 2.2.3),
or an app-to-control flow rule manipulation (Section 2.2.1). Moreover, resource exhaustion
attack(Section 2.2.2) and malicious command execution (Section 2.3.3 and Section 2.2.1) can
stop the services provided by the controller.
2.3.5 Decoupled
The SDN controller splits the data plane and the application plane from the control plane, which
makes the two interfaces, i.e., southbound interfaces and northbound interfaces, risk the man-
in-the-middle attack. TLS, as one of the most common solutions, encrypts the communications
of these two channels but increases the performance overhead and elevate the difficulty of
implementation on the data plane [76]. However, the lack of implementing TLS in SDN
allows a compromised application to leak out some sensitive information, such as network
configuration and traffic statistics, and enables more advanced attacks by allowing attackers to
conduct analysis on the flow tables, the control software and the models of OF switches [131].
Man-in-the-middle attack
In SDN, the man-in-the-middle attack can exist in the data plane (between OF switches),
southbound API (between control plane and data plane), northbound API (between control
plane and application plane) and eastbound/westbound API (between controllers). In regular
networks, an attacker has to wait until an operator logs into each switch management interface
using an insecure protocol (e.g., Telnet, SNMPv2) to capture credentials. However, the
OpenFlow specification (up to v1.3.0) makes TLS optional. Thus there is the risk of a successful
man-in-the-middle attack in an in-band SDN architecture. An attacker can immediately seize
full control of any downstream switches and execute quasi-imperceptible eavesdropping attacks
that would be difficult to detect [76].
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Data leakage
The application plane is decoupled from the control plane to provide business logic to the SDN
controller, which enables network management intelligence. However, the ability to manage the
network state via the network application means that even the access to the network application
should be protected. OpenDaylight, ONOS, and Ryu each provide a GUI for interacting with
the controller. In the case of ONOS, there is no authentication/authorization required to access
the GUI or to apply the REST calls. From inside the network, the IP address of the device
hosting the controller is required. OpenDaylight provides some security, requiring a user-
name/password to log in to the controller GUI, namely the DLux module. Ryu offers a basic
topology viewer rather than a full GUI. The topology viewer provides a graphic illustration
of the network topology, link status and flow entries. It is not secured. Despite the extensive
security enhancements introduced in SE-Floodlight, the web user interface using REST is
not access-controlled. For secure deployment, this controller interface should be protected to
prevent data leakage [119].
2.3.6 Flow-based rule
In SDN, forwarding decisions are flow-based instead of destination-based. A flow rule is
broadly defined by a set of packet field values acting as a match (filter) criterion, a set of actions
(instructions), timeout, counter, and priority etc. But these attributes can be used to compromise
SDN controllers, such as priority-bypassing attack [147] and flow rule conflict [109] [110]
[132] [57].
Flow rule conflict
The SDN controller, as a network OS, mediates the flow rules, namely flow entries, from the
application plane. One of its major challenges is resolving the conflict of flow rules generated
by the different network applications or by malicious applications [109] [110] [132]. One
example is that attackers can use the set action in the flow rule to compromise the network.
The purpose of the set instruction in OpenFlow is similar to NAT or proxy in the traditional
network, which modifies the packet’s header information for the enablement of virtual tunnels
between hosts. A virtual tunnel can be used to circumvent an inserted flow rule to prevent two
hosts from establishing a connection. [109] and [110] have proven that this action can be used
to mislead the SDN controller to send packets to unexpected destinations. The rules conflict is
also studied in a number of works [132] [57] [23] [134] [50]. Interestingly, all reported threats
and attacks affect all versions (1.0 to 1.3) of the OpenFlow specification.
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Priority bypassing attack
Packet match fields in the flow rule are used for table lookups depending on the packet type, and
typically include various packet header fields, such as Ethernet source address, IPv4 destination
address or ingress port etc. In a priority-based mechanism, the packet is matched against
the table and only the highest priority flow entry that matches the packet must be selected.
The priority bypassing attack implies that a malicious application with the lowest priority
predominates in rule making when higher priorities fail and is executed on the data plane
[147]. [147] presents several attack models that cause higher priority rule-based policies to fail,
including IP-passing, MAC-passing, VLANs-crossing, as well as DoS. With the increase of the
header fields in OpenFlow, attackers have more opportunities to launch this attack.
2.4 Third dimension
In this section, the threat STRIDE model will be used to classify the threats to the SDN
controller, which we have discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3.
Spoofing
An attacker may introduce a malicious entity into the network and connect the SDN con-
troller with a spoofing identity. The malicious entity can be (1) data-to-control faked packet,
including spoofing ARP packet [83], LLDP packet [83][137] and IGMP packet [83], (2) an
controller(Section 2.2.4), (3) a networking device (Section 2.2.3) or (4) a malicious network
application injection (Section 2.3.2).
Tampering
The tampering problem is mainly due to the malicious network application injection. Any
resource data, including log information, backup flow table contents, policy (Section 2.2.1),
configuration data (Section 2.2.3), and network topology information (Section 2.2.2), can be
modified in the controller. An attacker modifies the data so as to clear the attack log or to
prepare further attacks on OpenFlow switches [99].
Repudiation
A repudiation attack is defined as one party participating in a transaction or communication
and later claiming that the transaction or communication never took place. The controller may
experience this kind of attack from applications or from upstream/downstream controllers when
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STRIDE Attack
Spoofing ARP spoofing[83]
LLDP spoofing[83][137]
IGMP packet [83]
Malicious device connection[8]
Malicious network application injection [70][126]
Faked controller connection[99]
Tampering Flow rule manipulation[70]
Core services manipulation[126]
Internal storage tampering[130]
Repudiation Execution chain interrupting[126][127]
Application conflict [110][132]
Flow rule conflict[109][110][132][57][23][134][50]
Information Vulnerability exploitation[126][127]
Disclosure Malicious scanning[131]
Man-in-the-middle[76]
Data leakage[119]
Denial of Service packet_in flooding DoS[83][131][55][129]
Code injection(Controller-level DoS)[110] [126]
Command injection(System-level DoS)[130][70]
Resource exhaustion[130][70]
Malicious flow attack[8][131][47]
Elevation of Priority-bypassing attack [147]
Privileges Flow rule injection[145]
Flow rule circuit[109][110]
Buggy application affection[130][99][81]
Zero-day attack[130][99]
Table 2.3 STRIDE model analysis of threats to SDN controller
24 3D Analysis on the Security of SDN Controller
there are controller hierarchies [99]. There are at least three needs for the SDN controller to
provide the non-reputation assurance as the SDN controller suffers from execution chaining
manipulation (Section 2.3.2), flow rule conflict (Section 2.3.6), and application conflict (Section
2.3.2), as these problems are due to the input conflict of co-existing network applications.
Information Disclosure
As the SDN controller is decoupled from the data plane and the application plane, the two
interfaces, i.e., the southbound interfaces and the northbound interfaces, can leak out sensitive
information, which we have discussed respectively in Section 2.3.5 and in Section 2.3.5. This
enables more advanced attacks by allowing attackers to conduct analysis on network properties.
Denial of Service
The centralized control of the SDN controller makes it a profitable target to launch DoS/DDoS
attacks, including packet-level, controller-level, system-level and network-wide level attacks.
The packet-level DoS means the packet_in flooding attack (Section 2.2.5); the controller-level
DoS is possible because a network application can maliciously manipulate built-in functions
to block the normal services provided by the SDN controller (Section 2.2.1); the system-level
includes the malicious system command injection to stop controller runtime (Section 2.3.3)
and resource exhaustion attack (Section 2.2.2); the network-wide level DoS is the malicious
flow which misleads the SDN controller to insert many useless flow rules and then statures the
data plane, which was discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Elevation of Privileges
There are at least two ways that allow for attackers to increase privileges on the SDN controller.
As the SDN controller can provide an API for third-party applications to be installed, a malicious
application may make a policy that conflicts with the policy from administrators or security
applications to bypass the administration policy or security policy [99], i.e., priority-bypassing
attack (Section 2.3.6). Moreover, a malicious application can also abuse the API to insert
numerous lower priority flow rules and then flush out the rule with higher priority [145], i.e.,
flow rule injection (Section 2.2.1). Flow rule circuit [109][110] can generate a flow rule circuit
and bypass the flow rule with high priority. Last but not least, an attacker may utilize the
vulnerabilities of the SDN controller software (e.g., software design error and software code
error) to elevate the privileges of the controller. SDN controller software can be run on a
server or a virtual machine so an attacker may utilize the vulnerabilities of the OS to elevate its
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Fig. 2.3 Key observation of the security analysis of the 3D approach
privileges [99], i.e., buggy application affection (Section 2.3.3) and zero-day attack (Section
2.3.3).
We conclude the key observation of this 3-dimensional analysis in Figure 2.3. The attacks
highlighted in black mean that they can be covered by any dimension analysis (4, 7, 14, 19, 22,
and 23). The attacks highlighted in blue mean that they can be covered by two dimensions. For
example, the attacks 2, 6, 9, 13, 17, 18, 21, 25, and 26 can be covered by both the Dimension
I and the Dimension III. The attacks 1, 3, 5, 8, 12, 24, 27, 28 can be covered by both the
Dimension II and the Dimension III. The attacks highlighted in red mean that the attacks can be
covered by single dimension analysis. For example, the attacks 10 can be covered only by the
Dimension I and the attacks 11, 15, and 20 which can be covered only by the Dimension III.
2.5 Security principles for the SDN controller
After conducting the security analysis, we resume nine the principles for enhancing the security
of the SDN controller here.
2.5.1 Principle 1: Data-to-control flow identification and verification
The data-to-control flow should contain the information including host migration, switch status
(switch hardware address/port updating), and packet-level information (packet processed by
which network application). These information can used to detect topology poisoning, faked
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device connection, malicious flow attack, and network application coexistence conflict. [137]
proposes two approaches that can secure the link discovery procedure without the burden of
manual effort, which are the authentication for LLDP packets and the verification for switch
port property. The authentication for LLDP packets, TopoGuard adds a controller-signed TLV
into the LLDP packet and check the signature when receiving the LLDP packets. The signature
TLV is calculated over the semantics of the LLDP packet (i.e., DPID and Port number). In
this case, the adversary can hardly manipulate the LLDP packets. However, this approach
suffers from the fact that it fails to defend against the Link Fabrication attack in an LLDP
relay/tunneling manner. An idea to mitigate the relay-based Link Fabrication is to verify of the
switch port property by adding some extra tags to track the traffic coming from each switch
port to decide which device is connected to the port for checking if any host resides inside
the LLDP propagation. The verification of every OF switch connection can protect against
malicious device connection [8]. The malicious flow which causes the network-wide DoS
can be identified by abnormal host migration (forged host) [83] [47]. [132] suggests putting
a flow tag to identify which network application is controlling the flow on the data plane and
thus avoiding the conflict. Hence, identifying the data-to-control flow helps SDN controller to
process the packet securely.
2.5.2 Principle 2: Entity authentication
Identity of all entities (e.g., switch, application, and the SDN controller) that access the SDN
controller via interfaces must be authenticated by the SDN controller. Certificate and shared
keys are common methods for identity verification [100]. Network application authentication
as a first protection secures the SDN controller from fake controller connection and malicious
network application injection (e.g., malicious operation like core services manipulation [126],
flow rule manipulation[70], command injection [130][70], code injection [110][126], and
execution chain interrupting [127][126]). We can authenticate the application with digital
signatures as the fingerprint of application like the scheme used in [110] and [130]. [110]
integrates the security extensions in the control layer, including the authentication service. Even
more, a role-based source authentication module in [110] provides digital signature validation
for each flow-rule insertion request to provisionally limit a candidate flow rules priority based
on the application’s operating role. [130] examines the authentication of applications based on
its signed key (application authorization module). A public key is provided and all application
developers are required to sign their applications with this key. The Certificate Management
Service in OpenDaylight [102] is used to manage the keystores and certificates to provide the
TLS communication. Apart from authentication, access control, which will be discussed in
Section 2.5.3, is also necessary to reinforce the controller from malicious operations.
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2.5.3 Principle 3: Security boundaries definition and access control
The SDN controller functions as a platform where several different network applications run
with different purposes (e.g., load-balancer, firewall, intrusion detection system and Network
address translation, etc). As the SDN controller opens a programmable API to thirty party
applications, app-to-control threats such as data tampering, illegal function calling or flow
rule manipulations can be used to attack the SDN controller. In this case, the definition of
security dependencies and control access according to the permission boundaries is one of the
efficient ways to protect the controller from dangerous network application operations. We
classify the access control of SDN in three categories: role-based permission set approach,
application-based permission set control and high-level SDN language approach.
Role-based permission control
The AAAmodule in OpenDaylight provides the role-based authorization service to differentiate
the permission of administrators and users, as well as connect with the LDAP server to extract
and to translate group information from LDAP into OpenDaylight roles [102]. Nonetheless, the
application-based permission control is still an ongoing work. So far, only the read permission
to protect the reading of the resources has been done in OpenDaylight [102].
Similarly, [109] and [110] propose a role-based authorization in a more fine-grained way.
The role-based authentication recognizes by default three authorization roles among those
agents that produce flow rule insertion requests. The first role is that of human administrators,
whose rule insertion requests are assigned the highest priority. Second, security applications
are assigned a separate authorization role. Flow insertion requests produced by security
applications are assigned a flow rule priority below that of administrator-defined flow rules.
Finally, non-security-related network applications are assigned the lowest priority. Roles are
implemented through a digital signature scheme in which [109] is preconfigured with the public
keys of various rule insertion sources. If a legacy network application does not sign its flow
rules, then they are assigned the default role with the priority of a standard network application.
The security mode of ONOS [96] adopts the role-based authorization proposed in [109] to
secure the ONOS controller.
Application-based permission control
[144], [120], [70], and [56] propose different permission set to limit operations of network
application. PermOF is another system that prevents a network application from invoking
system calls without permission. Specifically, it proposes the use of 18 permission sets under
four distinct categories (Read, Notification, Write, and System). The former three categories are
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OpenFlow-related permissions for accessing the controller’s resources, whereas the remaining
category controls the access to the local resources provided by the SDN controller’s host. This
permission set is incorporated into the controller kernel, as the network application needs to
access to controller, the controller requires the corresponding permissions. The category system
is used as the network application calls the services from the controller’s host. To achieve this,
it adds an extra layer between host and network applications by modifying the source code of
host OS [144]. This approach isolates control flow and data flow, and enables the controller
to mediate all the applications’ activities with the outside world. However, experimental
evaluation on this proposed access control system is not yet available.
OperationCheckpoint [120] adopts the part of the permission set of PermOF in constrain-
ing the northbound API access and implements the permission set in the SDN controller
Floodlight. In contrast, PermOF does not show any preliminary implementation results. Oper-
ationCheckpoint saves the unique application IDs mapped to the set of permissions granted
to that application and the network administrator can add or remove application permissions
by this unique ID. Its REST API can call for applications to query the controller and discover
their assigned permissions as well as logs all unauthorized operation attempts to a log file for
auditing. OperationCheckpoint is implemented in Floodlight for securing its methods to carry
out the functions described by each of the permissions in the permission set. Unfortunately,
the implementation of this permission set seems unfeasible for large-scale or complicated
controller schemes, as it needs to scan all the related functions in the source codes and modify
them.
Inspired by Android permission control, [70] is a permission system based on OF mes-
sages states and the actions. It classifies the OF messages in five state categories with
five actions: (1) Sending OF packet_out message, (2) Sending f lowmod_add message, (3)
Sending f lowmod_delete message, (4) Sending f lowmod_modi f y message and (5) Sending
stats_request message. In addition, there are two permissions that limit the network applica-
tions’ access to the controllers’ resources at the running time. The first one is DATABASE for
controlling the access to internal storage and the second one is SYSTEMCALL for limiting
to execute system calls. The permission set of the network application can be structured in a
format similar to XML. The network administrators can use this system to select permissive
operations, thereby allowing the necessary features for the network application to be specified.
In contrast to other approaches, this approach provides the permission system with five states
for each of the permissions, which helps application users to determine when the application
uses each OpenFlow protocol. However, we believe that OperationCheckpoint can achieve the
same goal by mapping its access control to the OpenFlow message.
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In addition, [145] [39] [146] propose a solution for a controller-independent secure integra-
tion of external SDN applications. Unlike PermOF and OperationCheckpoint, these solutions
are effective as long as the applications reside in the controller and do not address the security
challenges that arise while applications are deployed externally to the controller.
[56] introduces a security framework called AEGIS to prevent controller APIs from being
misused by malicious network applications. The usage of API calls in AEGIS is verified in real
time by security access rules that are defined based on the relationships between applications
and data in the SDN controller. AEGIS monitors network applications running on top of
the controller’s core modules, and intercepts the execution flow of applications through API
hooking.
High-level SDN languages and controllers
These emerging proposals [83], [27], [28], [12], [40], [22], [58] embrace a variety of program-
ming paradigms and introduce abstractions on all levels of network programming entities,
such as packet, network topology and composition operation. [83] provides a policy language
that enables administrators to specify validation checks on incremental flow graphs. Frenetic
[12] designs different pieces of high-level language for state querying, packet forwarding
and logic composition. Their following work, NetCore programming language [41], expands
the query language and the packet-processing language, and provides formal semantics for
this novel language. A parallel work, Procera [27], embraces a fully reactive programming
paradigm and introduces a different abstraction of the network resources. Pyretic [40] proposes
dramatically different programming models for packet, network topology and policy operation.
All these SDN policy languages serve as vehicles to specify concrete network forwarding
policies. SDNShield [22] permission language specifies the behavior privileges of SDN apps,
and thus has different semantics and scope with the above SDN policy languages. Kinetic [58]
looks for an intuitive domain specific language for implementing dynamic network policies.
It exposes a language that allows operators to express network policy that maps directly to a
model checker based on computation tree logic(CTL).
2.5.4 Principle 4: Network application resource control
Different from access control, the resource usage of the net- working app should be controlled
to avoid control crashes due to the exhaustion attack from the network application. The control
here includes resource monitoring, limitation and separation.
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Resource isolation
One of the root causes of the fragility of the controllers is their tight coupling with applications.
Thus, one effective approach to protecting the controller from the malicious behaviors is to
isolate the network applications from the controller. Yanc [81], an SDN controller platform,
adopts UNIX-like permission to prevent network applications from exposing the network
configuration and stating it as a file system. In yanc, network applications are independent
processes, provided by multiple sources. Applications benefit from the virtual file system
(VFS) layer used to distribute the file system, as well as namespaces that are used to isolate
applications with different views (e.g., slices).
[130] separates network application from the controller and each new application in Rose-
mary is invoked as a new process. Rosemary’s network application connects to the SDN
controller process through the IPC (inter-process communication). Moreover, Rosemary com-
partmentalizes the controller’s kernel modules by separating not only the applications, but
also the modules in the controller. Hence, this design increases the robustness of a controller
because it only runs necessary services. The services in the Rosemary kernel communicate
with each other through an IPC channel, and the implication is that if a service crashes, other
services are immune to this crash. In contrast, controllers such as Floodlight, NOX, and POX
implement all necessary functions in a single zone.
LegoSDN [32] uses AppVisor, a proxy service, to separate network applications from the
controller. There are two parts in AppVisor: AppVisor Proxy in the control layer and AppVisor
Stub in application layer. They communicate with each other via a RPC-like mechanism
based-on UDP.
The network application in SE-Floodlight [110] should be instantiated as a separate process
and ideally operated from an independent, non-privileged account. The connections to the server
can be secured using standard SSL communication with either server or mutual authentication.
[19] proposes a strong software isolation mechanisms by partitioning the control plane
both on the controller and on the switches. They separate the controller into Isolated Virtual
Controllers (IVC) and Isolated Virtual Switches (IVS) along with per-flow, per-tenant, per-
host, and per-application. This configuration ensures that a malicious flow or a network
application cannot compromise the whole controller and limits the damage. However, it causes
performance overhead due to the frequent creation and deletion of new virtual machines. An
extreme configuration case would be making per-flow, per- app, and per-host into independent
processes. Eventually, they adopt a per-tenant granularity and attempt to find a balance between
security and performance.
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Network application monitoring
An application that keeps allocating memory can consume all of the available memory in a host,
thereby affecting other applications. Separation of the network application from the controller
may not be sufficient in mitigating this effect. We need resource monitoring and limitation for
each network application. For example, Rosemary limits the resources that each application
can use and incorporates resource monitoring services that track and recognize the resource
utilization of each application.
The hard limit specifies the value for which a network application cannot exceed in terms of
resources. For example, if a hard limit value for the memory item is 2 GB, then the application
is terminated if it attempts to allocate more than 2 GB of memory. The soft limit defines a
recommended value that each application may nonetheless surpass. Violations of the soft limit
result in an alert that is passed back to the application and reported to the network operator.
2.5.5 Principle 5: Provide high availability of service
The SDN controller centralizes the control over the network, exposing it to the risk of failure
from one single point. This, however, can be mitigated by the use of distributed controllers,
which logically centralizes and physically distributes the controllers. A robust recovery system
can also help the controller to recover services from crash.
Distributed controllers
ONOS [103] as a native distributed controller adopts a master-slave mode to deploy the
controller nodes. Once the master node crashes, it will randomly select another slave node to
be upgraded as the master node to handle the control over the whole network. The distributed
SDN control plane (DISCO) [77] is implemented on top of the Floodlight [35], which provides
control plane functionalities to distributed networks by using Advanced Messaging Queuing
Protocol (AMPQ) [25]. It is composed of two parts i.e., intra-domain and inter-domain.
The intra-domain modules enable network monitoring and manage flow prioritization for the
controller to compute paths of priority flows. The inter-domain part manages communication
among controllers and uses the channels provided by the messenger agent to exchange network-
wide information with other controllers. Another example is HyperFlow, which supports a
distributed event-based control plane for OpenFlow. It logically centralizes but physically
distributes the controllers.
In [141], the authors propose a coordination framework on top of the control plane to allow
controllers working as controller clusters by supporting the communication among controllers
via the communication library JGroups [33]. In this framework, the controllers elect a master
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Principle Threat to mitigate
Principle 1 Malicious flow DoS[8][131][47]
ARP spoofing[83]
LLDP spoofing[83][137]
Malicious device connection[8]
Application conflict [110][132]
Principle 2 Core services manipulation[126]
Flow rule manipulation[70]
Command injection[130][70]
Code injection[110][126]
Execution chain interrupting[126][127]
Faked controller connection[99]
Principle 3 Core services manipulation[126]
Flow rule manipulation[70]
Command injection[130][70]
Code injection[110][126]
Execution chain interrupting[126][127]
Storage data tampering[130]
Principle 4 Resource exhaustion[130][70]
Principle 5 packet_in flooding DoS[83][131][55][129]
Code injection(Controller-level DoS)[110] [126]
Command injection(System-level DoS)[130][70]
Resource exhaustion[130][70]
Malicious flow attack(DoS)[8][131][47]
Principle 6 Man-in-the-middle[76]
Data leakage[119]
Principle 7 Application conflict [110][132]
Flow rule conflict[109][110][132][57][23] [134][50]
Execution chain interrupting[126][127]
Principle 8 packet_in flooding DoS[83][131][55][129]
Principle 9 Buggy application affection[130][99][81]
Zero-day attack[130][99]
Table 2.4 Security principles for threats to SDN controllers
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node in the controller cluster, which conducts and maintains the global controller-switch
mapping in the network. Other nodes periodically monitor the master node, and if the master
node is found to be inaccessible, it is immediately replaced by one of the other nodes. Thus,
the proposed framework does not expose a single-point-of- failure. In doing so, it helps the
SDN controller to avoid the challenge of one-single-point-of-failure [24]. It allows network
operators to deploy multiple controllers, being capable of local decision making, in order to
maximize controller scalability and minimize the flow-setup time. There are more examples
of distributed controllers such as HP VAN SDN, PANE, and Fleet [136][31][7], while it is
demonstrated in [52] that simply utilizing multiple controllers in SDNs cannot protect the
network from single-point-of-failures. The reason is that the load of controllers carrying the
load of the failed controller can exceed their capacity and hence worsen the situation, e.g., a
cascade of controller failures.
In [11], a hybrid control model is proposed to combine the centralized control with some
distributed control behavior. The security-enhancing architecture in this hyper control model
can be found in [79], which aims to secure flow installations and prevents the malicious use
of distributed control by applying device authentication (Trust Manager) and checking each
end-to-end request. In addition, in order to handle Byzantine attacks and guarantee that each
switch can correctly update its flow tables (even in the presence of compromised controllers that
issue false instructions), [4] proposed a resilient mechanism to secure distributed controllers.
One of the challenges of distributed controllers is to keep the data consistency among the nodes.
For this, Onix, ONOS, and SMaRtLight provide strong data consistency among the distributed
controllers during node updates in the network [95][139][51].
Another example design is proposed in Kandoo [133], which is essentially a hierarchical
controller framework that consists of two or three layers. Kandoo adopts the bottom layer as
a group of controllers with no interconnection, and no knowledge of the network-wide state.
Controllers at this layer run local control applications (i.e., applications that can function using
the state of a single switch). The top layer is a logic-centralized controller that maintains the
network-wide state. Controllers at this layer handle most of the frequent events and effectively
act as shields.
The hierarchical controllers in [49] and [48] are even proposed with more than two layers.
For instance, in order to reduce the traffic load and to avoid a single point of failure at the
controller node, [48] distributes the controllers role by introducing three levels of control:
Principal Controller, Secondary Controller, the Local Controller. The Principal Controller plays
the role to obtain a global view of the network infrastructure and the Local Controller acts
locally by managing and relaying signaling messages from ordinary nodes to the Secondary
Controller.
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System recovery
The quick recovery mechanism of controller can be used to restore the services provided by
controller once it crashes. [19] and [14] propose to recover the failed controller. In particular,
[19] automatically uses the mechanism of rolling back to a pristine state. As in the existing
SDN controller, once the controller is compromised, the damage remains over time. Rollback
can help the controller to revert periodically the process to its pristine state. [14] introduces a
fail-over scheme with per-link Bidirectional Forwarding Detection sessions and preconfigured
primary and secondary paths computed by an OpenFlow controller. [17] uses the CPRecovery
approach for the resilience of the failures in SDN. This mechanism is implemented as a network
application. Unlike the distributed controllers’ approach, where the controller would need to
collect the information from the data plane, CPRecovery allows inter-communication between
controllers using a messenger component to provide an interface for receiving and sending
messages through SDN controllers.
2.5.6 Principle 6: Assuring data confidentiality and non-repudiation
To protect the controller from the information disclosure and data tampering, the SDN controller
should keep data confidentiality and non-repudiation during data exchange and storage. Using
on open standard is likely to bring benefits in both portability and interoperability, especially
due to the diversity of the NBIs — a more generic approach to secure them is recommended.
For example, transport layer used to exchange data between app-to-control, data-to-control and
different controllers, is highly recommended to secure the communication channel with the
TCP enhancement techniques which have been previously proposed for this purpose and are
widely deployed [62] [67] [63] [68]. Therefore in the case of security functionalities such as
encryption, authentication, and integrity, adoption of these existing techniques is recommended
over development of a new transport layer solution in SDN. To avoid data leakage, the SDN
controller can adopt these techniques to secure channels including the southbound, northbound,
and eastbound/westbound interfaces. Authenticating the LLDP packets and host entity are
one of proposed solutions in TopoGuard to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack in the data
plane [137] [76]. These techniques can be adopted to protect the data in controller storage
non-repudiation. Note that the use of legacy protocols or algorithms (e.g., MD5, Transport
Layer Security (TLS) 1.0) are no longer recommended by standard organizations as they have
been proven to be insecure, and should be avoided [98].
To identify and provide common compatibility and interoperability between different
controllers, it is necessary to have a secure and standard east/westbound interfaces as SDNi
[64] proposes. [82] suggests a finer distinction between eastbound and westbound horizontal
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interfaces, referring to westbound interfaces as SDN-to-SDN protocols and controller APIs and
eastbound interfaces as standard protocols for the communication with legacy network control
planes (e.g., PCEP [90] and GMPLS [89][221]) [45].
2.5.7 Principle 7: Keeping operation records traceable and accountable
Data such as the network application operation record, flow entry, and resource usage should
be kept traceable and accountable in log files, monitoring records, and flow rules identified
with network application.
Network application operation accounting
The log record is useful for network troubleshooting non-reputation services as a malicious
network application can modify flow tables or inject malicious flow rule, etc. [110] introduces
an audit subsystem that traces all security-related events occurring in the control layer. With
this auditing record, SE-Floodlight can report to network administrator the event time, message
type, full message content, the application credential, the disposition (outcome) of the message,
and optional message specific field attributes. Crash-Pad in LegoSDN [32] is an event-driven
mechanism which classifies failures into (i) Fail-stop failures and (ii) Byzantine failures. Fail-
stop failures are network application crashes and Byzantine failures are the output of network
application when network policies are violated. Crash-Pad takes a snapshot of the state of a
network application prior to its processing of an event and should a failure occur, it reverts back
to this snapshot. This is unlike the OFRewind, which is a network-event-based audit system
for recording and playing back SDN control-plane traffic [29]. OFRewind is able to replay
these network events through topologies for troubleshooting or debugging network device and
control plane anomalies.
App Zone of Rosemary [130] monitors flow rule enforcement operations initiated by an
application to investigate the presence of any abnormal behavior. For example, an operation is
considered abnormal if an application tries to enforce too many flow rules that cannot be inserted
into the data plane. In this case, the flow rule enforcement module monitors this operation,
and reports if it finds these abnormal behaviors. In the current state, it has a threshold-based
detector, which generates an alert when it finds an application that tries to deliver more flow
rules than a predefined threshold value. [146] and [145] record every request from network
application to ease the accounting as attacks happen and detect flow rule conflicts.
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Rule conflict resolution
There are several different approaches to mitigate the security issues caused by malicious flow
rules injection and misconfigured or tampered flow rules. FlowTags [132], an extended SDN
architecture in which middleboxes add tags to outgoing packets, provide the necessary causal
context (e.g., source hosts or internal cache/miss state). These tags are used on switches and
(other) middleboxes for systematic policy enforcement. The challenge here is that the FlowTags
need to customize the switch by adding tags in the packet in order to identify which network
applications work on it.
FortNOX and SE-Floodlight incorporate a live rule conflict detection engine in the controller
kernel, which mediates all flow rules insertion requests. FortNOX presents a conflict analysis
algorithm integrating in the controller’s kernel; SE-Floodlight improves the computational
performance of this conflict analysis algorithm (logarithmic vs. linear) and support for multi-
switch deployments. The rule conflict analysis is performed using an algorithm called the
Alias Set Rule Reduction, which detects rule contradictions, even in the presence of dynamic
flow tunneling using set and goto actions. When such conflicts are detected, the controller
can choose either to accept or reject the new rule, depending on whether the rule insertion
requester is operating with a higher security authorization than that of the authors of the existing
conflicting rules [109] [110].
FlowGuard extends HSA [108] for inline rule conflict detection and resolution in the
context of firewalls in order to build more robust firewalls in SDN environments. Still, it
does not deal with the problem of conflict resolution among competing network applications.
FlowGuard operates on single switch environment and its algorithm does not handle inter-table
dependencies [57]. FLOVER [134], a model checking system based on the Yices SMT solver
existing on the application plane, verifies the instantiated flow rules which does not violate the
network’s predefined security policy.
NICE way [80], a network application, addresses the data inconsistency problem in SDN,
especially those caused by events happening at different switches and end hosts or communica-
tion delays with the controller. It does so by using model checking to explore the state space of
the entire system, which includes the controller, the switches, and the hosts.
2.5.8 Principle 8: Flow statistics and Rate limiting
Packets rate limiting control avoids flooding DoS attacks in the data-to-control flow. The
SDN controller should define the life cycle for the data-to-control flow, e.g., shorten the flow
idle connection timeout, and control the flow rate. SPHINX [83] detects OF messages DoS
attacks, i.e., packet_in, on the SDN controller by observing flow-level metadata to compute
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the rate of packet_in messages. It raises an alarm if packet_in messages throughput is above
the administrator-specified threshold.
[129] proposes the system Avant-Guard, which introduces a data plane solution to reduce
the amount of data-to-control plane interactions that arise during such attacks in the data plane.
It implements a SYN proxy module and only exposes those flows that finish the TCP handshake.
This switch-based solution introduces actuating triggers over the data plane’s existing statistics
collection services. These triggers are inserted by control layer applications to both register for
asynchronous call backs and insert conditional flow rules that are only activated when a trigger
condition is detected within the data plane’s statistics module. Avant-Guard needs a customized
switch, which allows for new functionality to be applied to every packet at high speeds, but
also presents a significant deployment challenge requiring network operators to deploy new
switches. On the one hand, Avant-Guard needs customized switches, on the other hand, this
switch-based approach makes Avant-Guard controller-independent. This means that all SDN
controllers can benefit from Avant-Guard to mitigate DoS attacks with little configuration effort.
The connection migration component of Avant-Guard improves resilience against TCP SYN
flood attacks better than other than protocols such as UDP or ICMP.
FloodGuard [55] introduces a protocol-independent defense framework for SDN networks,
which contains two new modules: proactive flow rule analyzer and packet migration. To pre-
serve network policy enforcement, proactive flow rule analyzer dynamically derives proactive
flow rules by reasoning the runtime logic of the SDN controller and its applications. To protect
the controller from being overloaded, packet migration temporarily caches the flooding packets
and submits them to the controller using rate limit and round-robin scheduling. FloodGuard
aims to defeat more generic saturation attacks in SDN, including UDP and ICMP, not only
limited to only TCP protocol as in Avant-Guard.
Similar to Avant-Guard, the OFX framework [9] [71] is an extension module that contains
security functions to protect the controller from data-to-control flood attack. However, unlike
Avant-Guard, the OFX security module does not require implementation changes to any part
of the OpenFlow stack and can be deployed on existing OF switches. In particular, the OFX
framework consists of the components distributed on the data plane and control plane. The
OFX library exists on the control plane by providing control applications an interface to handle
all the modules related to controller-to-switch communication, including loading the module
onto the switches. A developer can write in OFX modules to prevent flood attacks, such as
push alerts, which allow a switch to signal to its controller whenever the packet- or byte-rate of
a flow exceeds a threshold.
38 3D Analysis on the Security of SDN Controller
2.5.9 Principle 9: Best practice for securing the runtime of the controller
If a malware infects the host running a controller, it can abuse the controller quite easily. Such
threats would be addressed through following best practices in host and network management,
e.g., regular patch management, isolating the controller from other unnecessary applications,
and fine-grained permission control. Although Rosemary spawns a new process for every
network application, and uses IPC method to communicate between the controllers, it still
cannot fully protect the controller from the malicious applications on the controller’s host. The
Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which provides the MAC mechanisms used to support and
to ensure secure communication between processes, should also be activated [106]. A shim layer
between the SDN controller and the OS can be used to protect the controller from malicious
or buggy applications installed on the OS to illegally access the controller by modifying the
OS’s source code [144]. Moreover, in order to avoid zero-day attacks, the fewer programs on
runtime with the SDN controller, the securer it will be. Last but not least, use defaults to make
the controller secure. This includes default behavior, default algorithms, default key length,
types of certificate, pre-defined access control policies, default password, closing unnecessary
ports (services) and the data-to-control flow life cycle configuration (timeout setting), etc [98]
[119].
2.6 Study on the security of controller implementation
We use the nine principles to analyze the security of five active and open source SDN controllers,
which are OpenDaylight, ONOS, Ryu, Floodlight, and OpenContrail.
The controllers have been selected based on their design. ONOS and OpenDaylight are
designed for scale-out i.e., multiple distributed controller instances. Floodlight has been de-
signed as multiple-thread controller for enhancing performance, and Ryu is included and based
on both security features and extensibility. OpenContrail is aimed at network virtualization
initially [119].
All of them have the host tracing and link discovery modules to identify the host and
switch connection. For instance, Ryu uses switches.py to identify OpenFlow Datapath ID
(DPID) and port ID, tracker.py to trace host with MAC, IP and location(attached port). The
LinkDiscoveryManager.java module and LocationManagementApp.java in Floodlight
identify the switch DPID and Port ID but it adopts only MAC for tracing host. None of them
verifies the legitimation of connection [137].
OpenDaylight and ONOS provide the network application authentication by the digital
signature; in contrast, Floodlight and Ryu do not. The call of RESTful API in OpenContrail
can be authenticated by auth token provided by OpenStack keystone [72]. OpenDaylight
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AAA services are based on the Apache Shiro Java Security Framework, which performs
authentication, authorization, cryptography, and session management for OpenDaylight [102];
ONOS security mode [96] extends FortNOX [109] RBAC (role-based access control) mode,
which can be configured as role in the ONOS policy. The ONOS security mode can apply
the access control features for the network application by specifying the permission-related
information. Unfortunately, the policy cannot configure the request quota in ONOS security
mode. OpenContrail also provides API-level RBAC relying on user credentials obtained from
OpenStack keystone. Note that all of these controllers provide only RBAC mode, but the
application-based access control remains a security issue to SDN control [144] [70] [120] [22].
OpenDaylight, ONOS and OpenContrail adopt the controller cluster to support high avail-
ability instead of disaster recovery. OpenDaylight and ONOS both can be configured as
distributed mode [119]. The OpenContrail system provides an east-west interface (BGP) used
to peer with other controllers for controller cluster configuration. From the point of view of
disaster recovery, although none of SDN controllers amongst these five selected controllers
have the ability for system recovery; but as OpenDaylight, ONOS and OpenContrail integrate
with databased as pertinent data storage, which can provide a disaster recovery for these data.
For example, OpenDaylight moves from SQLite to H2 as persistent data storage in Lithium
distribution. The recover tool (org.h2.tools.Recover) can be used to extract the contents
of a database file, even if the database is corrupted. RAMCloud database used by ONOS [103]
provides a fast crash recovery promise [46]. Similarly, Cassandra, default database used in
OpenContrail, can restore data from a snapshot when the table schema exists. In contrast, Ryu
and Floodlight keep the data only in memory, which make it become difficult to restore the
data from crash.
All these controllers run over Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide authentication
and confidentiality for securing the channel to connect with the data plane. The controllers
including OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight and OpenContrail can establish the identity of
clients using TLS authentication to its northbound interfaces in [112] and [97]. In contrast,
the northbound interfaces in Ryu do not yet adopt TLS to secure. The request of the north-
bound interfaces should be authenticated by password in OpenDaylight and ONOS. The API
server of OpenContrail works in either authentication mode or non-authentication mode. In
authentication mode, API server connects to authentication server to authenticate each request.
Only requests from authenticated user are accepted. Unfortunately, Floodlight and Ryu do not
provide any security mechanism to limit the requests of the northbound APIs, which should not
be considered as a good practice in term of principle 9.
For the five controllers keep the log files for network application operation accounting [119].
For example, the Java-based controllers OpenDaylight, ONOS, and Floodlight uses log4j to
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ODL ONOS Ryu FL OC
Principle (Lithium) (Junco) (3.5) (1.2) (R4.0)
1 Host/Switch ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
identifying
Connection
verification
2 Switch ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
authentication
App ✓ ✓ ✓
authentication
3 RBAC ✓ ✓ ✓
App-based partial
access control
4 Resource partial partial partial
control (JVM) (JVM) (JVM)
5 Distributed ✓ ✓ ✓
System partial partial partial
recovery (H2) (RAMCloud) (Cassandra)
6 Southbound ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Northbound ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
7 Operation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
accounting
Rule conflict ✓ ✓
resolution
8 Traffic control
9 Secure default ✓ ✓ ✓
configuration
Table 2.5 Security analysis of SDN controller implementation
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record the log messages in different levels like INFO or ERROR report. OpenContrail uses a
command-line utility to retrieve system log messages, object log messages, and trace messages.
Of the five controllers analyzed in this work, only ONOS and OpenContrail implement
policy conflict resolution. In ONOS, the application describes its network requirements in the
form of “intents” and ONOS translates these intents with respect to the network configuration,
which is supported by a shared data store [119]. Data models also play a central role in the
OpenContrail System. Its data model consists of a set of objects, their capabilities, and the
relationships between them. The data model permits applications to express their intent in
a declarative rather than an imperative manner. In this way, the flow rule can be expressed
without describing its control flow and avoid the logic error [72].
As the controllers OpenDaylight, ONOS and Floodlight are based on JVM (Java virtual
machine), which can be configured to provide a JVM-level computing resource control, which
means the malicious application cannot crash the host of these controller; however, the malicious
application can still exhaust the JVM computing resource or attack other legitimate applications
running on controller.
After conducting an analysis, we find that these five controllers lack of the security mech-
anisms such as connection verification, traffic control, and app-based access control. For
resource usage control and system recovery are partially support. In contrast, OpenContrail
and ONOS provide a relatively securer services compared with other controllers.
The analysis of this section is resumed in Table 2.5. The symbol (✓) means the security
principle is considered and realized in the controller implementation. The abbreviations of
ODL, FL, and OC represent OpenDaylight, Floodlight, and OpenContrail respectively.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents a 3-dimensional approach to study the security issues of the SDN
controller. We conclude that the southbound interface, the northbound interface and core
services are the three weakest components of the SDN controller. The southbound interface
suffers from the data-to-control spoofing packets and flow flooding. Attackers tamper core
services of the controller via the northbound interface. The characteristics centralization and
off-the-shelf make the SDN controller vulnerable from DoS and elevation of privileges(mainly
due to the injection of malicious application to the controller’s run-time) respectively. Moreover,
the SDN controllers lack still the security mechanisms like connection verification, application-
based access control, and data-to-control traffic control. In the following chapters, we attempt
to mitigate the app-to-control threats due to the malicious network application operations.

Chapter 3
Security Enhancing Layer for SDN
Based on the analysis in Chapter 2, we found that one of the major threats is due to the
malicious operations of the network application. Although the access control can be one of
approaches to secure the SDN controller against the malicious requests from the network
application, but it is insufficient to limit network application behaviors with only authentication
and gross-grained authorization or to merely adopt a role-based authorization. We need to
control network application in a fine-grained way with AAA, i.e., authenticating network
application, authorizing the operations, and accounting or monitoring network applications
behaviors [110] [109] [120] [144] [130] [29]. We continue the work [39] to provide a wider
and deeper study on how to use the REST-like system to protect SDN controller from malicious
network application. Firstly, we explore the functions that can possibly be deployed via the
REST-like system, and then add a security-enhancing layer (SE-layer), where it is implemented
a protocol to secure the interaction between the network applications with the SDN controller.
The prototype I of this SE-layer is called Controller SEPA. In this prototype, the SE-layer
secures the SDN controller with application authentication(token-based) and authorization.
Moreover, it repacks and standardizes the data through the northbound interfaces for hiding
the controller’s sensitive information from the malicious scanning. It also provides a more
fine-grained access control between the application plane and the control plane with. Finally,
it enables the controller being decoupled from the network application via TCP/IP socket
for avoiding the threat from the resource exhaustion attack. We study the feasibility network
applying this framework to five open-source controllers, which include OpenDaylight, ONOS,
Floodlight, Ryu and POX. We implemented the SE-layer prototype I Controller SEPA upon
the controller OpenDaylight and the results show that the deployment operates with very
low complexity (most of time the modification of source codes is unnecessary) and with the
performance overhead 0.1% -0.3%. We continue to develop the SE-layer prototype II, called
Controller DAC, by adding the app-to-control request accounting service in this SE-layer,
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as we found that malicious network application still can infect the SDN controllers by the
API abuse, even the controller is hardened by the static permission control as proposed in
the works [120], [144], [70], and [22]. We address the app-to-control threats based on the
analysis with the four permission categories: READ, ADD, UPDATE and REMOVE on four
open source and active SDN controllers, including OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, and
Ryu. All of these SDN controllers cannot be immune from the attack caused by the API abuse.
The prototype II Controller DAC works as a controller-independent dynamic access control
system for protecting SDN controllers against API abuse. In our implementation upon the
OpenDaylight controller, Controller DAC requires low deployment complexity for securing
SDN controllers, and most of time its operation is independent from underlying SDN controller.
The preliminary experimental results show that Controller DAC can prevent SDN controllers
from API abuse with less than 0.5% performance overhead. This SE-layer can hence enhance
the security of the SDN controller in an efficient way with the fine-grained access control.
3.1 Background and motivation
As the northbound interfaces in SDN are still non-standardized and very diverse, this results
in remaining many security issues for the app-to-control access control. One approach is to
add permission sets for controlling the API request [120] [144] [130] [22]; another approach is
to use programming languages to specify the security constraints to the app-to-control access
[140] [12] [58]. We introduce the access control based on permission sets here as these works
inspire us to design the access control in our SE-layer.
3.1.1 PermOF and OperationCheckpoint permission sets
In [144], the authors propose 18 permission sets to control network application with the four
categories Read, Notification, Write, and System. The Read category is for reading the data
such as topology and flows. The Write permission is used to modify the flow entries or send
packet_out message. Notification is for receiving the network events and System permission
is for the system-level calls. The proposal of PermOF does not have the real implementation.
In [120], the permission control are implemented by assigning permission verification to
the related functions. However, it may be infeasible to secure the controller’s functions by
modifying every function in the source codes. In the worst scenario, it would need to scan all
the related functions (methods). For example, in order to control the topology information,
OperationCheckpoint needs to modify the codes of the two methods: getAllSwitchMap
and getLinks in two different classes Controller.java and LinkDiscoverManager.java,
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respectively, since both of them provide the topology related information in Floodlight. In some
SDN controllers, like OpenDaylight and ONOS, it is very hard to scan and find out all these
related-methods and harden them. The permission sets for PermOF and OperationCheckpoint
is summarized in Table ??. The symbols in Table?? ‡ means the permissions are proposed both
in PermOF and OperationCheckpoint, † only in PermOF, and ∗ only in OperationCheckpoint.
3.1.2 States-based permission control
Inspired by Android permission control, [70] is a permission system based on OF messages
states and the actions. It classifies the OF messages in five state categories as following:
• INITIAL. Network application in this state when controller just starts.
• READY. Network application in this state after INITIAL state, i.e., it’s ready to receive
a new event
• PACKETIN. Network application in this state if controller receives and forwards a
packet_in message
• FLOWREN.Network application has this permission if controller receives a f low_removed
message
• PORTSTATUS.Network application has this permission if controller receives a port_status
message
These states work with five actions for the network application : (1)Sending OF packet_out
message, (2)Sending f lowmod_add message, (3)Sending f lowmod_delete message, (4)Send-
ing f lowmod_modi f y message and (5)Sending stats_request message. In addition, there are
two permissions for limiting the network application to access the controller’s resource at the
running time. The first one is DATABASE for controlling the access internal storage and the
second one is SYSTEMCALL for limiting to execute system call. The permission set of the
network application can be structured in a format similar to XML. The network administrators
can use this system to select permitting operations, thereby allowing the necessary features
for network application to be specified. Specifically, this approach provides the permission
system with five states for each of the permissions, which helps application users to determine
when the application uses each OpenFlow protocol in a more fine-grained way. However, we
believe that OperationCheckpoint can achieve the same goal by mapping its access control to
the OpenFlow message. This permission control also requires to modify the controller codes to
be adopted.
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3.1.3 Role-based access control
FortNOX and SE-Floodlight propose role-based authorization [109] [110]. The role-based
source authentication recognizes by default three authorization roles among those agents that
produce flow rule insertion requests. The first role is that of human administrators, whose rule
insertion requests are assigned the highest priority. Second, security applications are assigned
a separate authorization role. Flow insertion requests produced by security applications are
assigned a flow rule priority below that of administrator-defined flow rules. Finally, non-
security-related network applications are assigned the lowest priority. Roles are implemented
through a digital signature scheme, in which FortNOX is preconfigured with the public keys of
various rule insertion sources. If a legacy network application does not sign its flow rules, then
they are assigned as the default role and priority of a standard network application. In addition
to role-based authentication, SE-Floodlight proposes that northbound messages can be divided
into four types for assigning permissions to different roles, which are listed as following [109]
[110]:
• OFmessage defines the OpenFlow elements such as the data-path identifier for a specific
switch.
• Controller service message provides remote access to controller services.
• Internal message is used for any configured non-SSL messages such as error events or
connection testing etc.
• Extensions message controls the access to auxiliary controller functions such as network
topology.
While this permission set design is coarse-grained and not used to constrain the operation
of network application. As a matter of fact, the ONOS security mode and AAA module of
OpenDaylight provide role-based (or called user-based) API authorization [101]. The security-
mode of ONOS adopts the "roles" proposed in FortNOX [96]. The Java APIs in ONOS are
also secured with static permission set based on network application for the internal APIs [16].
3.1.4 Access control design challenges
The challenge for these permission set proposition is on the implementation: how to implement
these permission set on the current SDN controller as it exists more than 20 SDN controllers
[125]? We look for an approach which should include the characteristics as following:
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Category Permission
Read ‡ read_topology
‡ read_all_ f low
‡ read_statistics
‡ read_pkt_in_payload
∗ read_controller_in f o
Notification ‡pkt_in_event
‡ f low_removed_event
‡error_event
†topology_event
Write ‡ f low_mod_route
‡ f low_mod_drop
‡ f low_mod_modi f y_hdr
‡mo f idy_all_ f lows
‡send_pkt_out
‡set_device_con f ig
‡set_ f low_priority
System †network_access
† f ile_system_access
†process_runtime_access
Table 3.1 PermOF and OperationCheckpoint permission control
1. Extensible. This means this approach should be controller-independent. This should
be a generic approach which can be extended to different SDN controller with low
deployment complexity.
2. Feasible. Some proposition is hard to applied to the actual situation. For example,
the approaches like OperationCheckpoint [120] needs to scan all the related functions,
which increases the cost to implement the access control mechanism and difficult(if
not impossible) in some large-scale controllers such as OpenDaylight and ONOS. The
modules compose of these projects are independent, this makes hard to cover all the
related-modules with the permission control.
3. Low performance overhead. The performance overhead for securing the controller
with access control should not be low. For example, the FortNOX accounts the rule
conflict by implementing the conflict detector in the controller kernel-level [109]. SE-
Floodlight extends from FortNOX to detect the flow rule conflicts in controller-level;
however, it is not suitable for big networks as it will produce tremendous latency when
the controller verifies every flow rule and reduce the controller performance [110].
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3.2 App-to-control threats
As SDN enables networking functionalities to be written in software by using open APIs to
facilitate development and accelerate network innovations. Unfortunately, problems arise when
an network application contains flaws, vulnerabilities, or malicious logic that may interfere
with control layer operations. In worse scenarios, the attack from app-to-control can be caused
not only by the non-authenticated network app but also by the authenticated one such as in the
flow rule conflict [110] [132]. We enumerate the threats here which are targeted to be mitigated
with SE-layer.
3.2.1 Data tampering
Once the malicious application can access the controller’s data storage or internal memory, the
abuse of such trust could lead to various types of attacks impacting the entire network. For
example, the packet_in count value is kept in the controller’s internal storage for the usage of
DoS detector or traffic monitoring. However, a malicious application can clear packet_in count
in the internal storage to confuse the DoS detector application. The controller also contains
the network link information and flow rules in data storage, if the network application can
modify these values, the topology and flow rules will be tampered [70] [130]. The problem
is caused by the poor access control and non-decoupling of the network application. Because
if the network application is non-decoupled from the controller, it will be easier to access the
controller’s runtime resources, such as memory or database. Even the type-safe programming
language like Java, the attacker can use JNI(Java native interface) to access the host’s memory.
3.2.2 Illegal functions calling
The SDN controllers always contain built-in functions for accelerating network application
development. However, once these functions are used maliciously, it will cause the controller to
crash or to be manipulated. For example, a malicious network application can terminate the con-
trollers by calling the function exit() in Floodlight, OpenDayLight and POX (sys.exit(0))
[130]. The IOFMessage Listener service in Floodlight can be used to change network appli-
cation in order to process packet_in message, as a result, the malicious network application can
interrupt the communication for packet_in messages among with other network applications
by modifying the order via this service [126]. The illegal function calling problem cannot be
mitigated merely by access control as some of the functions are system-level like exit(). The
malicious application can inject the system-level commands easily if it does not decouple from
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the controller’s runtime. Hence, the decoupling of the network application and then authorizing
the operation can really protect the controller against the illegal function usage.
3.2.3 Malicious scanning
Network application exchanges data with SDN controller via northbound interface. One of the
most popular northbound interfaces is RESTful API, which is adapted by controllers such as
OpenDaylight, ONOS, Ryu, Floodlight, etc. Unfortunately, [131] proves that an attacker can
identify a SDN-based network for the further attacks, eg., DoS/DDoS, by estimating the time
of inserting a flow entry in the network. Even worse, [69] and [8] show the risk to expose the
type of a SDN controller to the attacker. For example, once the attacker identifies a Floodlight
controller which domains a SDN-based network, he/she can launch the malicious requests until
saturating the controller’s memory, technically JVM.
3.2.4 API abuse
Alough the access control is one of the most general approach to protect the controller against
the malicious application. However, the static permission control proposed by [144] [120]
cannot really secure SDN controllers from API abuse. We exploit the vulnerabilities of the
static access control along with four permissions categories as they propose, i.e., READ, ADD,
UPDATE and REMOVE, and point out their vulnerabilities in this section.
API abuse with READ permission
READ permission is the less authorization which can get the related information but without
the right to modify them. However, even malicious requests can infect the SDN controllers.
We test this attack by requesting to read topology information with Python scripts on four SDN
controllers. We found that none of SDN controllers protect this kind of malicious requests.
When we use more than 3 scripts to request SDN controllers continuously with a infinite loop,
some of them happen to drop the packets from southbound, such as ONOS and Floodlight.
In practice, it is difficult to exhaust all the CPU capacity as we can find in Table 3.2 with the
malicious requests via RESTful APIs as the network bandwidth is limited. However, according
to our observation, we found that when the southbound API and northbound API share the same
bandwidth in SDN, i.e., the same NIC(network interface card). Once this network bandwidth is
saturated by requests from northbound, which results in dropping the packets from southbound.
Even though we do not found OpenDaylight and Ryu to drop the packets from southbound
obviously under this attack, but both of them suffer from responding slower.
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CPU usage OpenDaylight ONOS Floodlight Ryu
Basic CPU usage 21.6% 2.7% 2.3% 0%
1 script request 42.3% 27.6% 9.6% 9.6%
2 scripts request 44.7% 36.5% 13.9% 23.6%
3 scripts request 45.7% 36.4% 14.6% 26.9%
4 scripts request 47.3% 36.7% 14.6% 32.9%
5 scripts request 47.2% 36.0% 14.7% 34.2%
Table 3.2 CPU usage overhead caused by malicious requests
API abuse with ADD permission
In OpenFlow-based SDN, forwarding decisions are flow-based. Each flow entry (or flow rule)
in a flow table contains match field, actions, counters, priority, and timeout, etc. Basically, when
an incoming packet matches a match field in flow entry, the switch performs corresponding
actions on the packet and updates the corresponding counters. If multiple rules are matched,
the priority field serves as a tie breaker to determine which flow entry should be applied to that
packet. However, this design is still easy to compromise, because most of the OF switches
available on the market have limited ternary content-addressable memory (TCAMs), with up
to 8000 entries [45]. Gigabit Ethernet (GbE) switches for common business purposes have
already supported up to 32 000 Layer 2 (L2) + Layer 3 (L3) or 64 000 L2/L3 exact match
flows [37]. Enterprise class 10GbE switches are being delivered with more than 80 000 layer 2
flow entries [88]. Other switching devices using high-performance chips (e.g., EZchip NP-4)
provide optimized TCAM memory that supports from 125 000 up to 1 000 000 flow table
entries [92]. However, in our tests, Open vSwitch has higher capacity to store the flow entries
up 148223 with SDN controller Floodlight (version 1.2). But as the OF switches in SDN are
dumb, once a malicious network application inserts more than this limitation through controller,
the new coming flow entries will flush out and replace the existing ones, without considering
the priority of flow entries, i.e., the flow entries with lower priority can replace the flow entries
with higher priority and be executed on data plane. Other SDN controllers such as ONOS
will crash directly once the number of flow entries in one switch is more than 45000. The OF
switches connected with OpenDaylight will produce a considerable latency to find a flow rule
to apply, even drop the packet, when the flow entries are up to 140000, and the OpenDaylight’s
API 1 for fetching flow entries can no longer work.
All of the SDN controllers tested in our research do not provide any protection mechanism
for this kind of threat even secured by static permission control. Moreover, a malicious network
application can insert a flow rule to reach the unexpected destination, to block another legitimate
1/restconf/operational/opendaylight-inventory:nodes
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service or to confuse the service provided by other network apps coexisting on the same SDN
controller such as the action set and priority in flow rule [109] [110] [147]. These security
issues cannot be resolved by simply allowing or disabling an network application to insert flow
entries.
API abuse with UPDATE permission
The poor network application priority management makes the network application has UPDATE
permission easy to compromise the network. As aforementioned, if a packet matches multiple
rules, the flow entry with highest priority will be applied. However, the coexistence of network
applications makes it hard in practice to determine which flow entry should prevail over others
[110] [132]. For instance, as we discussed in last chapter, suppose application 1 initiates a
series of flow rule insertions designed to quarantine the flows to and from a local Internet server.
Application 2, a load-balancing application, redirects incoming flow requests to an available
host within the local Internet server pool. Suppose the Internet server quarantined by application
1 subsequently becomes the preferred target for new connection flows, as this quarantined
server is now the least loaded server in the pool. In this case, should application 1 or application
2 prevail [110]? Even worse, there is no constraint among network applications to modify the
flow entry inserted by other network applications. In static permission control design, network
application has the permission to modify flow entry can possess the full operation permission
to modify any field in any flow entry inserted by any network applications. A malicious
network application can compromise network with UPDATE permission by modifying the
priority field in other flow entries and make its own flow entries have highest priority. In
OpenDaylight, the API /sal-flow:update-flow 2 can be abused to modify any flow entries
with any priority inserted by any network application. Similar security problems can happen on
ONOS and Ryu due to poor priority management on the APIs such as /devices/<deviceId>
and /stats/flowentry/modify respectively.
Fortunately, this threat is mitigated in Floodlight by adopting separated APIs to modify flow
entry in different network application. The /wm/staticflowpusher/json with POST method
can only modify the flow entry in Statistic Flow Entry module while /wm/firewall/rules/json
with POST method modifies the flow entries in Firewall module. But the IOFMessage
Listener service in Floodlight could be used to change network application in order to
process packet_in message. As a result, the malicious network application can interrupt the
communication for packet_in messages among other network applications by modifying the
order via this service. Similarly, any network application in ONOS can access to global param-
2API root: http://<IP>:8080/restconf/operations/
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eters in the controller via the northbound service ComponentConfigService to set PACKET
OUT ONLY to be true for degrading the overall performance of the network [126].
API abuse with DELETE permission
Apparently, an network app with DELETE permission can easily compromise network in a
violent way, such as directly removing other flow entries. The SDN controllers including
OpenDaylight, ONOS and Ryu suffer from this problem as we mentioned in Section 3.2.4. The
APIs /sal-flow:remove-flow with DELETE method, /flows/<deviceId>/<flowId>,
and /stats/flowentry/clear/<dpid> provided by OpenDaylight, ONOS and Ryu respec-
tively can be used to remove all other flow entries without any consideration of the priority in
other flow entries.
In Floodlight, this threat is also mitigated by assigning APIs to different network apps,
like /wm/staticflowpusher/clear/<switch>/json and /wm/staticflowpusher/json
with DELETE method can only remove the flow entry in Statistic Flow Entry module, while
/wm/firewall/rules/json with DELETE method removes the flow entries in Firewall
module, and /wm/acl/clear/json, and /wm/acl/rules/json with DELETE method can
only remove the flow entries in ACL module.
Conversely, a malicious application can also frequently delete the rules in a switch if it is
only limited based on static permission control, so that every time when a new packet arrives,
it should be sent to the controller for requesting a rule to enforce. This attack can affect the
performance of both the data plane and the control plane by consuming controller’s resource
and degrading the overall performance[70] [83]
After a deeper study, we provide a non-exclusive list in Table 3.3 for the APIs needed to be
secured from API abuse in these four SDN controllers.
3.3 Services provided by the SE-layer
For mitigating the threats mentioned beforehand, the services provided by the SE-layer are as
following.
3.3.1 Authentication and Authorization
To prevent the controller from malicious network application, the basic protection is to authenti-
cate the network application. For example, SE-Floodlight and Rosemary use digital signatures
to authenticate the network application [110] [130]. [39] also adopts key pairs to authenticate
the network application.
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Controllers READ ADD
OpenDaylight /opendaylight-inventory:nodes/node /sal-flow:add-flow
/network-topology:network-topology
ONOS /devices /flows/ <deviceId>
/link /link
Floodlight /wm/device /wm/staticflowpusher/json
Ryu /stats/flow/<dpid> /stats/flowentry/add
/stats/group/<groupId> /stats/groupentry/add
UPDATE DELETE
OpenDaylight /sal-flow:update-flow /sal-flow:remove-flow
ONOS /devices/<deviceId> /flows/<deviceId>/<flowId>
/links/<linkId> /links/<linkId>
Floodlight IOFMessage Listener
Ryu /stats/flowentry/modify /stats/flowentry/delete
/stats/groupentry/modify /stats/groupentry/delete
Table 3.3 The RESTful APIs needed to be secured from API abuse
After the application authentication, the controller should authorize the requests of the
network application, including the enforcement of the flow entry. [120], [70], [144], and
[39] show the network application-based access control. PermOF proposes the use of 18
permission sets under four distinct categories without experimental evaluation of the access
control system proposed. OperationCheckpoint adopts the part of the permission set of PermOF
in constraining the northbound interface access and implements the permission set in SDN
controller Floodlight, but this permission set does not enable network application users to
distinguish malicious applications from benign ones [120]. Moreover, this permission set is
not controller-independent, i.e., it should modify the source codes on every controller that
attempts to apply this system. [39] proposes a controller-independent solution for securing
the integration of external network app via RESTful API. However, it is not able to find the
malicious operations of the network application. Inspired by Android permission control, [70]
is a permission system based on OpenFlow messages states and the actions.
3.3.2 Accounting
The audit log record is useful for network troubleshooting as well as a data source for security
monitoring as an network application modifies flow tables or sends a packet_out message etc
[120] [39] [110] [32]. For instance, SE-Floodlight [110] introduces an audit subsystem that
traces all security-related events occurring in the control layer. With this auditing record, the
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controller can report to the network administrator the event time, the message type, and the
full message content, etc. Hence, the data tempering, illegal function calling and malicious
rule injection can be traced by the accounting records. Hence, we need the accounting service
to protect the controller against the API abuse by evaluating the requests from the network
application.
3.3.3 Network application isolation
A malicious network application can create multiple memory objects, large number of threads,
infinite loops or non-stop growing linked lists to deplete the resources of the controller’s
host. Controllers such as NOX, Beacon, Floodlight and OpenDaylight do not limit memory
allocations to its applications, which can ultimately result in the controller crashing with an out-
of-memory error [70] [130]. One of the primary reasons behind the fragility of the controllers is
their tight coupling with applications. YANC adopts UNIX-like permission to separate network
apps from exposing the network configuration and stating it as a file system [81]. [130] and
[19] propose to separate network app from SDN controller even by processes. Rosemary [130]
separates network application from the controller by invoking each new network application in
Rosemary as a new process. Rosemary’s network application connects to the SDN controller
process through the IPC (inter-process communication). The basic network services in the
Rosemary kernel communicate with each other through an IPC channel, and the implication
is that if a service crashes, other services are unaffected. Fortunately, as the SE-layer adopts
RESTful API to communicate with network application via TCP/IP. In this case, the network
application can be decoupled and run on any host remotely. This can secure a controller from
an exhausting resources attack from malicious network application and prevent the controller
from crashing. As we repack the service into RESTful APIs, network application can call these
services via the network and run the services in a machine isolated from the controller. This is
a more secure way than decoupling network application from the controller by process or file
system [130] [81].
3.3.4 Information undisclosed
As an attacker should first identify the controller before compromising a SDN-based network
[131] [69] [8], hiding the sensitive SDN controller information can be used to avoid the
malicious scanning. The threats we aims to mitigates and the corresponding countermeasures
are summarized in Table 3.4.
3.4 SE-layer Prototype I: Controller SEPA 55
Authentication/ Operation Information Application
Authorization accounting undisclosed isolation
Data ✧ ✧ ✧
tempering
Illegal functions ✧ ✧ ✧
calling
Malicious ✧
scanning
API abuse ✧
Table 3.4 App-to-control attacks and corresponding countermeasures
3.4 SE-layer Prototype I: Controller SEPA
Based on the threat models in Section 3.2, we find that it is insufficient to limit network appli-
cation behaviors with only authentication and coarse-grained authorization or to merely adopt
a role-based authorization. We need to control network application with AAA, i.e., authenti-
cating network application, authorizing network application, and accounting (or monitoring
network applications operations) [120] [144] [109] [110] [130] [29]. Even more, for avoiding
the system-level function calling by the network application, the SE-layer should be able to
separate the network application from the controller for isolating the resource usage.
3.4.1 Design principle of Controller SEPA
We continue the work [39] to provide a wider and deeper study on how to use the REST-like
system to protect SDN controller from malicious network application. Firstly, we explore more
functions that can possibly be deployed via the REST-like system, called Controller SEPA
(SEPA: Security-Enhancing Plug-in for network App). Secondly, we study the feasibility of
applying this framework to five open-source controllers, which include OpenDaylight, ONOS,
Floodlight, Ryu and POX. The high-level architecture of Controller SEPA is depicted in Figure
3.1.
Authentication
Controller SEPA can verify the network application based on password or authentication token.
Before requiring the data from the controller, the network application should register with the
required permissions and then be validated by the network administrator. Once the network
application is validated, the request of the network application will be verified by the password.
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Fig. 3.1 High-level view of Controller SEPA
If the password is matched, the controller will deliver a token to the network application and
automatically refresh in a time interval, eg., 30 minutes.
Authorization with fine-grained control
When the network application registers on the controller, it should deliver its operation permis-
sions on the SDN controller(actually here is to the SE-layer as it delegates all the interaction
between the controller and the network application). The SE-layer will deliver an authentication
token, which contains the information about the network application such as id, permission
scopes, and priority, etc. Controller SEPA will check its permission by this token. Even more,
as Controller SEPA repacks the services of the controller, it can control them in a more fine-
grained way. An application has permission to access the database, it will have full permission
to obtain any resources without limitation. But with this module, the network application will
be constrained by the permission as to which resources they can get. Controller SEPA can
even limit their scope in the same resources. For example, if both of the network apps have
permission to insert a flow rule, one of them may have full permission to insert a rule for any
network with any priority while the other is constrained by the fact that it only has permission
to insert the rule for 10.0.0.100/24 to 10.0.0.200/24 with priority between 100 and 200. In
doing so, we can control the network application in a more refined way.
Hence, we extend the permission set proposed in [39], as well as referred to the permissions
in PermOF and OperationCheckpoint [120] [144]. We conduct first the possibility of the
permission sets proposed by the current existing controllers and summarize the categories of the
permission sets in Table 3.5. Furthermore, referring these sets to the proposition in PermOF and
OperationCheckpoint, the permission set used in Controller SEPA is as shown in Table 3.6. The
symbol✽means this API is officially supported in the SDN controller, Controller SEPA can
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Category Permission ODL ONOS FL Ryu POX
Read host.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read switch.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read link.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read port.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read flowmod.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read group.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✬
Read vlan.read ✽ ✽ ✽ ✽
Read topology.read ✽ ✽ ✽
Read statistics.read ✽ ✽
Read application.read ✽ ✽
Read controller.read ✽ ✬
Write port.write ✽
Write flowmod.add ✽ ✽ ✽ ✽
Write flowmod.write ✽ ✽ ✽ ✽
Write vlan.add ✽ ✽ ✽ ✽
Write vlan.write ✽ ✽
Table 3.5 RESTful-based northbound interface list of the current controllers
use it directly and repack without touching the controller’s source codes; the symbol✬means
SDN community has released the contributions for this API. The permission description is as
following.
• host.read Read all or specific host(s) info
• switch.read Read all or specific switch(s) info
• link.read Read all or specific link(s) info
• port.read Read all or specific ports(es) info
• flowmod.read Read all or specific flow entry(ies) info
• group.read Read all or specific group info
• vlan.read Read vlan info in a flow entry
• topology.read Read topology
• statistics.read Read statistics
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• application.read Read other network app info
• controller.read Read controller info (listen IP, port)
• port.write Update port status
• flowmod.add Add a flow entry with any action
• flowmod.writeUpdate/remove a flow entry with any action
• vlan.add Add a vlan tag in a flow entry
• vlan.write Update/remove vlan tag in a flow entry
For example, the APIs for reading packet_in, packet_out, f eature_reply, and f low_mod
events can be used in SPHINX to form the flow graph and detect the malicious flow in the data
plane [83]. The APIs used to read port status (/get/port/*) can be used in TopoGuard to
detect the malicious host migration [137]. We provide a nonexclusive list of the possible APIs
because the APIs are demand-driven, i.e., we should know the needs of network application
and then offer the necessary APIs; hence, we can only list the basic APIs. More features such
as queue, meter, group, MPLS tags and priority-setting etc will be discussed in our future
work. We conduct the feasibility study of this permission sets as following with five current
mainstream SDN controllers.
Controller-independent
For reducing the deployment complexity, this SE-layer should be controller-independent.
This means this should be a generic approach to the most SDN controllers. Hence, the
Controller SEPA can set up the connection with the SDN controller and the controller delegates
operation permission to Controller SEPA. The network application only communicates with the
services provided by Controller SEPA. Hence, it is controller-independent, i.e. it can reduce the
deployment complexity for the application to the current SDN controllers [39]. In the following,
we discuss case by case why this SE-layer is controller-independent by studying the northbound
interfaces of the current mainstream open source controllers, which are OpenDaylight, ONOS,
Floodlight, Ryu and POX.
OpenDaylight case
OpenDaylight uses Java API or RESTCONF to communicate with data storage. Hence, we bene-
fit from RESTCONF protocol, which is implemented as an network application in OpenDaylight
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Category Permission SE-layer API
Read host.read /get/device/<all> or <hostId>
Read switch.read /get/switch/<all> or <switchId>
Read link.read /get/link/<all> or <linkId>
Read port.read /get/port/<all> or <portId>
Read flowmod.read /get/flowmod/<switchId>/<all>or<entryId>
Read group.read /get/flowmod/<switchId>/<all>or<entryId>
Read vlan.read /get/vlan/<switchId>/<all>or<entryId>
Read topology.read /get/topo
Read statistics.read /get/statistics
Read application.read /get/app/<all>or<appId>
Read controller.read /get/controllerinfo
Write port.write /post/port/<switchId>/<entryId>
Write flowmod.add /put/flowmod/<switchId>
Write flowmod.write /post or remove/flowmod/<switchId>/<entryId>
Write vlan.add /put/vlan/<switchId>/<entryId>
Write vlan.write /post or delete/vlan/<switchId>/<entryId>
Table 3.6 Permission sets proposition for Controller SEPA
(restconf module). OpenDaylight provides a rich RESTful API support and we repack these
services into Controller SEPA as standard RESTful API opening to network application. For
example, we repack the addresses in /openflow:n/node-connector/openflow :n:m3 to
/get/device/* for obtaining the host’s information such as MAC and IPs and /openflow:
n/table/0/ to /get/flowmod/<switchId>/* to get the flow entries in switch n. Open-
Daylight supports only role-based control, not application-based, that means, once a network
application has the permission to use restconf module in OpenDaylight, it will have the full
permission to operate the data storage. Therefore, Controller SEPA can be a security-enhancing
module to provide application-based AAA control for OpenDaylight with low deployment
complexity [101].
ONOS case
Similar to OpenDaylight, ONOS also adopts Java API as well as implements RESTCONF
protocol as an network application ( org.onosproject.drivers), we repack the services in
ONOS by merging, for example, /v1/devices and /v1/links into /get/switches/all in
Controller SEPA to get the complete information about switches and their connection status.
3API root: opendaylight-inventory:nodes/node
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SDN controller OpenDaylight Beryllium SR2
OS Ubuntu 16.04
CPU Intel i7, 8 cores
Memory 16G DDR2
Network simulator mininet
Topology Linear with 20 switches * 20 hosts
Security extension RESTful APIs based on Java Spark
Table 3.7 Controller SEPA experimental settings
The ONOS strict mode also uses role-based control like OpenDaylight. This means that it
can also benefit from the application-based AAA control provided by Controller SEPA [95].
Floodlight case
Floodlight supports RESTful APIs natively, such as /wm/device/ for showing the details
of the hosts connections, and /wm/staticflowpusher/list/<switch>/json for reading
the proactive flow rules in switch. The shortage of authenticating the use of network app
can be supplemented in Controller SEPA, which can provide the digital signature service to
authenticate the network application without touching the source code in Floodlight. Evidently,
it can also benefit from the application authorization and accounting services in Controller
SEPA [35].
Ryu case
Ryu is a component-based SDN controller, which provides complete northbound interface for
network application development as shown in Table 3.5. Even more, Ryu (version 3.5) does not
yet support the TLS for northbound interface, i.e., no HTTPS for securing the communication
between the network application and the SDN controller. Controller SEPA can be used as
the security-enhancing module to improve the problem of shortage of northbound interface
encryption as well as provide app-based AAA control for Ryu [94].
POX case
POX, an early SDN controller, does not use RESTful API, but Python API, as the official
northbound interface. That means we should implement manually the RESTful API server
in POX, such as Flask, for transferring data in POX via RESTful API. Fortunately, we can
find contributions in community for the RESTful API support in POX such as pox-jsonrest on
GitHub [15].
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API 1 API 2 API 3 API 4 API 5 API 6
OpenDaylight 15328 15184 67248 1275 1263 1305
Controller SEPA 15355 15194 67269 1281 1265 1309
Percent(%) 0.176 0.066 0.031 0.047 0.158 0.307
Table 3.8 Performance overhead of Controller SEPA
Information undisclosed
Controller SEPA repacks all the services provided by the SDN controller, including RESTful
APIs (OpenDaylight, ONOS and Floodlight), OSGI bundles(OpenDaylight and ONOS) or
Python API (POX) into new standard APIs and exposes them to the network applications. As
network application can only communicate with Controller SEPA instead of the SDN controller,
network application does not know the details concerning the SDN controller or which version
is providing the services, i.e., the controller is protected from malicious scanning.
3.4.2 Controller SEPA experimental validation
In our implementation, we tested howController SEPA secures OpenDaylight (version Beryllium-
SR2), which runs on a Ubuntu-based(16.04) machine with CPU Intel i7, 8 cores, and 16G
DDR2 RAMS. The controller connects with a linear topology with 20 OF switches and 20
hosts on each (total 400 hosts) simulated by mininet. We resume the testbed configuration
in Table 3.7. Figure 3.2 shows that Controller SEPA repacks the two APIs provided by dif-
ferent SDN controllers, OpenDaylight and Floodlight(1.2) respectively. In this figure, the
repacking service provided by Controller SEPA enables: (a) Controller SEPA repacks the API
/network-topology:network-topology provided by OpenDaylight RESTCONFmodule to
/get/device/all; (b) Repacking the API /wm/device in Floodlight to /get/device/all.
For example, both of them repack the information about host with IP 10.0.0.1 and MAC
00:00:00:00:00:01 into the same form of response.
After the repackage, both of them become /get/device/all and show the same responses
to network applications. By doing so, we hide the sensitive information about controller from
network applications. Similarly, we also successfully deployed one application can only insert
flow entry with action output to a specific port while the other network application can do more
actions such as output to controller and flood the packet for testing the fine-grained control
on network application. In these implementations, we did not modify any source code of
OpenDaylight and provided a more secure and fine-grained control on network application.
In Table 3.8, we find the average latency of 20 times tests after Controller SEPA repacks
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Fig. 3.2 Controller information protection
the services provided by OpenDaylight. The services calling time comparison (millisecond)
between OpenDaylight and the repacked services in Controller SEPA are as following.
• API 1: get devices info
• API 2: get links info
• API 3: get flow entries
• API 4: insert a flow entry
• API 5: update a flow entry
• API 6: remove a flow entry
We use Java spark framework as RESTful API server and JS as client to call the APIs. The
repackage in Controller SEPA produces negligible latency, from less than 0.1% to 0.3%. The
same design principle can be applied in other SDN controllers as shown in Table 3.6. For API
3 to get the flow entries, which contains the flow entries to allow ICMP packets between all
hosts, it closes to 67200 ms after the seventh run from 242000 ms at the first run.
3.5 SE-layer Prototype II: Controller DAC
In this section, we develop the SE-layer prototype II Controller DAC as the static access control
cannot really secure controller from the malicious operations. We enrich the SE-layer prototype
I Controller SEPA with the dynamic access control for accounting the malicious requests
of northbound interfaces from the network applications. We propose SE-layer prototype II,
Controller DAC, to prevent SDN controllers from API abuse specifically as mentioned in
Section 3.2.4.
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3.5.1 Design principle of Controller DAC
Controller DAC, SDN Controller Dynamic Access Control System, provides a controller-
independent security-enhancing system for protecting SDN controller against malicious network
application with low deployment complexity. It consists of three component, which are a
northbound security extension, a controller specific IDS, and a high-level policy engine. Figure
3.3 depicts the high-level architecture of Controller DAC. By coordinating these components,
Controller DAC can provide dynamic access control on network applications by accounting the
network application requests. In the following, we introduce the three main components and
how they coordinate systematically to secure the SDN controller.
Security extension
The northbound interface in the SDN architecture keeps the communication between the SDN
controller and network applications. Generally, it may be any form of APIs such as Java
APIs or RESTful APIs. As there are more than 20 SDN controllers that exist in the market
today [125], it is infeasible to secure the controller by scanning function by function in each
individual SDN controller as [120] attempts. In some cases, like OpenDaylight and ONOS, it
produces high deployment complexity to do so. Hence, Controller DAC repacks the built-in
services provided by northbound APIs as we did in the prototype I Controller SEPA. This can
be accomplished by repacking RESTCONF services in OpenDaylight and ONOS as well as
RESTful APIs in Floodlight and Ryu. [146] shows the repackage produces quite negligible
latency (0.1% - 0.3%), which is why we extend this approach to harden APIs. The SDN
controller keeps communication exclusively with Controller DAC security extension, and
security extension exposes these secured RESTful APIs to network applications. Hence, it is
controller-independent as Controller SEPA, i.e., it can reduce the deployment complexity for
the application interacting with the current SDN controllers [39].
This security extension will authenticate and authorize every request from network ap-
plication as well as checking about the request legality with accounting records provided by
controller specific IDS, which we discuss about in more details under Section 3.5.1. This
extension adopts both password-based authentication and token-based authentication. Once the
password is validated, security extension will deliver a token with expiration validation. Before
the token expires, network application can keep calling the services with this authentication
token. If the token expires, the network application can automatically refresh the token by
delivering the password again. The authorization services provided in security extension can
be done by coordinating with the Controller DAC policy engine, which we discuss in Section
3.5.1. Thanks to this security extension, every request from network application is uploaded to
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Fig. 3.3 High-level view of Controller DAC
the database, including the event time, requested APIs, network application Id, and the request
contents.
Policy Engine
Controller DAC has a high-level policy engine which pre-defines the APIs request thresholds
for each network application and their permission scopes. Figure 3.4 is the template of
how policy engine defines the policies for each network application as they call northbound
APIs. For example, ofappX in this policy template has the permission to insert the flow
entry(/add/flowentry), but the configuration in policy engine limits it to call this API 50 times
per 60 seconds maximum(seconds="60" times="50"), which means ofappX can insert 50 new
flow entries per minute maximum. This configuration can prevent this network application
to flush out other flow entries inserted by other network applications, as the others could be
configured for having higher capacity to insert more flow entries than ofappX per minute.
Moreover, comparing to ofapp1, which has higher priority configuration of, the priority
configuration for ofappX is only 80. That means that even ofappX has the permission to modify
flow entry(/update/flowentry), but it cannot modify the flow entries inserted by ofapp1.
For fastening the configuration work in policy engine and proving more compatibility with
other controllers, policy engine can configure network apps in API-roles instead of configuring
them individually. If SDN controllers OpenDaylight installed AAA module or ONOS activated
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Fig. 3.4 High-level policy template
security mode, their roles configurations can be mapped directly to our API-roles in policy
engine. By default, we propose three policy roles as follows by referring to [109] [110], and
intend to coordinate this SE-layer with the security extension of the NFV orchestrator[104]
[105]:
• ADMIN: This role has the highest operation thresholds and highest network application
priority. By default, the network application is configured with this role can use APIs
without constraints.
• SECURITY: The network applications with this role can call APIs with higher opera-
tion thresholds and higher network application priority than DEFAULT but lower than
ADMIN. This role can be used for security-related network applications.
• DEFAULT: For general network applications like topology viewer, routing configuration
and performance optimization, they could be configured with this role. This role has
lower operation thresholds and lower network application priority than ADMIN and
SECUIRTY. Hence, the network applications configured with this role, even if they have
permission to modify or remove flow entries, will be prevented from modifying the flow
entries inserted by SECURITY role and ADMIN role because these two roles have higher
network application priorities.
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Fig. 3.5 Controller DAC work flow
Controller specific IDS
As all the requests from network application is uploaded to database via Controller DAC security
extension, the SDN controller specific IDS takes the role to accumulate the information about
permission scopes and accounting records of network application from database and policy
engine. This IDS traces the records with the event time, network application ID, requested
APIs, and the message content. Based on this information, this IDS can detect whether network
application requests reading data too many times from the controller or is adding additional
data into controller, alongside with the thresholds defined in policy engine. Moreover, it detects
the legacy for updating and deleting any data in controller based on the network app priority
configured in policy engine.
3.5.2 Controller DAC experimental validation
In our implementation, we tested howController DAC secures OpenDaylight (version Beryllium-
SR2), which runs on a Ubuntu-based(16.04) machine with CPU Intel i7, 8 cores, and 16G
DDR2 RAMS. Controller connects with a linear topology network simulated by mininet, which
consists of 20 OF switches and 400 hosts, i.e., there are 20 hosts connecting on each OF switch.
In OF tables of each OF switch, the flow entries for full ping among the hosts in networks are
inserted. The northbound security extension is written by Java based on Java Spark framework
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Fig. 3.6 The protocol implemented in the SE-layer
for repacking the OpenDaylight built-in RESTful APIs and securing them with AAA control.
The IDS interacts with MySQL as database. To make database resilient, we deploy database on
ERS of AWS. The configuration of testbed is resumed in Table 3.9. In order to mitigate the
latency caused by network transmission, Controller DAC adopts multi-threading processing by
opening three threads (1) the first thread is the Controller DAC main thread, which validates
every request from network application according to permission set and operation accounting
record. This thread obtains the permission configuration as well as APIs requests for each
network application from policy engine as Controller DAC starts. (2) the second thread is used
to keep updating the accounting records per second, and store them as a global static entity
in memory, which is ready to be called by other thread, and (3) the third thread records every
request from network applications on controller and uploads them to database. Figure 3.5 is
the work flow of our Controller DAC prototype. The policy engine adopts the standard data
transmission format XML. All experimental settings are summarized in Table 3.9. Hence, in
this SE-layer, we implement a protocol for securing the interaction between the SDN controller
and the network applications in the external APIs as depicted in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6 is
mapped from the work flow of the Controller DAC in Figure 3.5. The in blue, orange, and
green lines of Figure 3.6 represent the thread 1, thread 2, and thread 3 in the Figure 3.5. The
thread 1, i.e., the main thread, listens to the requests from the network applications, thread 2
keeps updating the accounting results from the data base, and the thread 3 is used to update the
database when a new request arrives. The protocol used to validate the request of the network
application in this SE-layer can be hence details in 11 steps:
68 Security Enhancing Layer for SDN
SDN controller OpenDaylight Beryllium SR2
OS Ubuntu 16.04
CPU Intel i7, 8 cores
Memory 16G DDR2
Network simulator mininet
Topology Linear with 20 switches * 20 hosts
Security extension RESTful APIs based on Java Spark
Policy Engine XML
Database MySQL 16G on AWS
Table 3.9 Controller DAC experimental settings
• Step 1: One thread (thread 2) is used to initialize the accounting entity from the rules in
the policy engine
• Step 2: Thread 2 keeps updating the accounting entity per second with the database.
• Step 3: The network application sends a request to the SDN controller. In fact, this
request will be captured by the SE-layer.
• Step 4: The main thread, thread 1, receives this request.
• Step 5: Another thread, i.e., thread 3, uploads the request to the database
• Step 6: The main thread checks the permission from the last accounting entity in IDS.
• Step 7: The main thread checks the operation and priority from the last accounting entity
in IDS.
• Step 8: The main thread reports the API request legitimacy to the security extension.
• Step 9: If the request is legal, security extension sends request to the controller.
• Step 10: The controller responds the request to the security extension
• Step 11: The security extension repacks the response and sends to the network applica-
tion.
Figure 3.7 is a part of security extension code, which shows how this extension repacks and
hardens OpenDaylight northbound API with dynamic access control. We explain this function
as follows.
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Fig. 3.7 Snapshot of security extension code in Controller DAC
• The return value Response(service.getTopo(req)) uses to call the RESTful API in Open-
Daylight(/ network-topology:network-topology) for getting the network topology. How-
ever, before returning this value, the request should be verified by the two functions
validatePermission(req) and validateAccounting(req) for checking the authorization and
accounting records respectively. For UPDATE and DELETE permissions, they need one
more step to check the network application priority.
• The function validatePermission(req) is used to check about the network application
permission scope. If this request does not have the assigned permission, the repacked
API will throw exception error.
• The function validateAccounting(req) gets the accounting records stored in memory from
IDS and checks this with the thresholds configured in policy engine. Once it finds this
network application runs out its quota to call this API, it returns exception error.
• The lambda expression get("/get/topo", (req, res)→ {...}, ...); means to repack the service
from returning value into "/get/topo" RESTful API, which is based on Java Spark.
• The two lines about starting AccountingServiceUtil is to upload this request to database
in a new thread.
• Finally, CommonUtil.getJsonTransformer() is to convert the data into Json and output it
via new RESTful API.
The high level policy will be interpreted in the tree structure as depicted in Figure 3.8. We
store this tree with 2 levels HashMap for speeding up the search, where we map the network
application to APIs in first level and map each API to thresholds in second level.
Notably, we did not modify any source code of OpenDaylight in our prototype and detected
effectively the API abuse. Table 3.10 reports average latency from 20 tests after Controller
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Fig. 3.8 Data structure interpreted from the high-level policy
DAC repacks the services provided by OpenDaylight and secures them with authorization and
accounting. The services calling time comparison (millisecond) between OpenDaylight and
Controller DAC.
• API 1 : GET method for obtaining network topology(/network-topology:network-
topology)
• API 2 : GET method for obtaining flow entries in table 0 of OF switch 1 (/opendaylight-
inventory:nodes)
• API 3 : POST method for adding a new flow entry(/sal-flow:add-flow)
• API 4 : PUT method for updating a flow entry(/sal-flow:update-flow)
• API 5 : POST method for removing a flow entry (/sal-flow:remove-flow)
We use Java spark framework as RESTful API server and JS as client to call these APIs.
The latency caused by Controller DAC is quite negligible, from 0.061% to 0.446%. The same
design principle can be applied in other SDN controllers.
3.6 Complexity analysis
As shown in Figure 3.4, all the policies are passed in the tree with 3 levels as depicted in Figure
3.8. The first level is root(OF app), the second level is APIs, and the third level is the threshold
of API request times per second, per minute, or a special time interval (e.g., 100 seconds). The
ofapp1 in Figure 3.4 is configured in the api-role SECURITY. In the SECURITY role, the APIs
"/get/topo" and "/update/flowentry" are limited to be called 100 times per 60 seconds
and 10000 times per 3600 seconds. The 2 APIs will be mapped to the second level in Figure 3.8.
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Finally, the request thresholds are mapped to the third level of the searching tree. As we store
this tree with 2 levels HashMap for speeding up the search. The first level HashMap is to map
the network application to APIs (identified by AppHashMap here) , and the second HashMap
level is to map the APIs to the request thresholds(identified by APIHashMap here). Finally, the
request thresholds as objects are stored in a ArrayList (identified by ThresholdList here).
Time complexity
When the ControllerDAC detects the requests from the network application, it will extract
the name of the application with the request API. The application name will send to the
AppHashMap and then find its APIHashMap. In this case, the time complexity is O(1) as we
map the key directly to the value. However, when the key collision in the HashMap, the worst
case of the data structure of HashMap in JVM is O(n), n is the number of the variables, because
JVM will transfer the data structure in self-balancing tree automatically. In this case, the worst
case for AppHashMap would be O(n), n is the number of the applications. Fortunately, there
is a very rare chance that this kind of collision will happen. In the default configuration, we
initialize the entity with the default capacity 16, i.e., 2 power 16 (65536). For example, if
we have 100 network applications needed to be detect the conflict in Controller DAC, the
chance to collide is 0.15%. The same, the APIHashMap will map the name of request API
(as key here) to the ThresholdList (as value here), in this case the time complexity is also
O(1) and O(m), m is the number of APIs. Finally, the ControllerDAC uses a loop to detect
whether the requests are over the threshold configured in the ThresholdList and makes the
time complexity O(k), k is the number of request thresholds configured in the 3.4 for each API.
Totally, the time complexity is O(k) (we ignore the two time complexity with constants, i.e.,
the two O(1) for the searching time in two HashMap AppHashMap and APIHashMap) and the
worst case is O(n*m*k). Usually, we do not configure too many request thresholds. We define
only the request threshold per second, per minute, per hour, or even more per day. Defining too
many request thresholds does not make much sense. In this case, the k even can be considered
as a constant. That is why we do not add the third level HashMap for mapping the time to the
threshold.
Space complexity
By contrast, the two AppHashMap and APIHashMap give the space complexity O(n) and O(m)
respectively, n is the number of the network applications and m is the number of the APIs. The
ThresholdList also gives the space complexity O(k), k is the number of request threshold. In
this case, the space complexity is O(m*n*k).
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Obviously, our approach is to exchange time complexity with the space complexity, because
the responding time is very critical for a SDN controller. We cannot delay the service to the
data plane due to check the request times of the network applications. Fortunately, the memory
space is always enough for our solution. For example, the most luxury memory requirement
of a SDN controller, OpenDaylight, is 8G RAM, but memory of the server for running the
SDN controller is always much higher than this, e.g., 16G RAM at least, or even more. Hence,
hardware capacity is enough to support our solution.
3.7 Discussion
Obviously, the actual implementations of the SDN controllers are different from each other;
however, SDN controller works as a network operating system, which includes the basic
components such as internal data storage, built-in functions, core network services, and pro-
grammable interfaces [126] [101] [35] [94] [15] [93] [73] [103]. We agree with the proposition
of the Rosemary controller [130] that a secure SDN controller should run only the essential
network service for keeping its reliability; other network services should be decoupled from
the SDN controller if possible. Hence, for securing the SDN controller from malicious network
application, the SDN community should clarify as soon as possible the core network services
provided by the SDN controller, such as OpenFlow messages processing, network topology
providing, flow entry management as well as which network services can be provided by third
party applications. The clarification of the basic network services provided by the controller
help the design and implement of the SE-layer. We demonstrate the utility of the SE-layer for
AAA control with low deployment complexity in this chapter. Basically, the services provided
by the SE-layer are more than AAA, which can include as following.
Communication encryption. The shortage of supporting SSL, i.e. HTTPS for network
application, makes communication in the northbound interface at risk of being tampered or
eavesdropped. Controllers like Floodlight, ONOS and OpenDaylight support HTTPS. Ryu
does not and OpenMUL does so only partially [101] [95] [35] [94] [78]. To protect the
controller from man-in-the-middle attack, encryption is one of the popular solutions to secure
the northbound interface for RESTful API. The SE-layer, working as a proxy, is able to encrypt
the communication between network application and SE-layer by using TLS, i.e., HTTPS for
RESTful API independently from controller, even if the SDN controller doesn’t secure the
northbound interface natively.
Rule conflict resolution. In SDN architecture, forwarding decisions are flow-based, which
is defined by a set of packet field values acting as a match (filter) criterion, with fields such
as actions (instructions), priority, counter and timeout etc. However, a malicious network
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API 1 API 2 API 3 API 4 API 5
OpenDaylight 5219 64199 1297 1278 1510
Controller DAC 5223 64238 1311 1281 1516
Latency 4(0.077%) 39(0.061%) 4(0.321%) 3(0.235%) 6(0.397%)
Table 3.10 Performance overhead of Controller DAC
application can insert a flow rules to reach the unexpected destination, to block another
legitimate service or to confuse the service provided by other network applications coexisting
on the same SDN controller such as the action set and priority in the flow rule [109] [110]
[147]. As each of attack based on the flow rule manipulation are specific, several different
approaches are proposed to mitigate the security issues caused by malicious or misconfigured
flow rules. The FlowChecker[50] system encodes OpenFlow flow tables into Binary Decision
Diagrams (BDD) and uses model checking to verify security properties. Veriflow [23] is a
real-time system that slices flow rules into equivalence classes to efficiently check for invariant
property violations. However, the evaluation of FlowChecker and Veriflow do not consider the
handling of set action commands as in FortNOX and SE-Floodlight [109] [110]. On top of
VeriFlow, [115] provides a library to verify correctness properties for network applications on
several controller platforms. FlowGuard extends HSA [108] for rule-conflict resolution in the
context of firewalls in order to build more robust firewalls in SDN environments. FLOVER
[134], a model checking system based on the Yices SMT solver existing on the SDN App plane,
verifies the instantiated flow rules which does not violate the network’s predefined security
policy. SRV checks the priority-bypassing attack by binding topology to check flow rules
[147]; FortNOX and SE-Floodlight use the Alias Set Reduce(ASR) method to detect the rule
conflict [109] [110]. Our SE-layer not only can keep the records about the network applications’
operation history; moreover, it can keep the inserted flow rules from network applications,
and uses the flow rule verification system to check the rule conflicts with various detection
algorithms, such as SRV or ASR etc, in parallelism [109] [147]. Moreover, the records of
request APIs can be use to trace and monitor the network application operation and furthermore
recognizes the resource utilization of network application as the complementary protection for
the SDN controller [32] [130]. In the next chapter, we will discuss the detection of the flow
rule manipulation caused by the priority field in the flow rule.
More rich services for network applications The efforts such as described in [120] [144]
and [39] show that the ability to notify events proactively (such as f low_mod or port_status
updated messages) is useful for network app development. Unfortunately, few SDN controllers
support this function. Controller SEPA can create this service by incorporating with the
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Authentication Operation Information Isolation Rule Encryption
Authorization accounting undisclosed resolution
Data ✧ ✧ ✧
tempering
Illegal ✧ ✧ ✧
functions
calling
Malicious ✧
scanning
API abuse ✧
MitM ✧ ✧
attack
Rule ✧ ✧
injection
Table 3.11 Perspective security services provided by the SE-layer
frameworks such as SSE (Server Sent Events) or Websockets etc. In the next chapter, a message
queue-based northbound interface can be used to notify the network events in a proactive way.
Finally, we resume the potential security services as the future work for the SE-layer in
Table 3.11. However, one of the shortages of the RESTful API is that it is based on web
service, which means it is not event-driven but client-server model. In this model, the network
application cannot obtain the network event in a proactive fashion, but it needs to request the
controller continuously for receiving the network event, e.g, packet_in message, in the real-
time. This problem will be resolved in the next chapter by using a decomposable event-driven
northbound interface.
3.8 Conclusion
The main concern, which prevents SDN from being widely adopted, is security. Specifically,
the SDN controller opens a programmable interface to the third party when accessed by the
malicious network application. The current proposals such as [120] [70] [144] [32] [126]
uses the permission sets to control the app-to-control access. Unfortunately, the tasks of
modifying all controller source codes or even scanning all the related functions for modifying
and enhancing its security are unfeasible; even worse, the static access control is insufficient to
secure the controller against API abuse. We propose a security-enhancing layer (SE-layer) to
protect the data exchange between the controller and the network application. The prototype I,
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Controller SEPA , protects the SDN controller in a flexible and efficient way. Controller SEPA
can work well with OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, Ryu and POX with low deployment
complexity. No modification of their source codes is required in their implementation while
the overall security of the SDN controller is enhanced with negligible latency from less
than 0.1% to 0.3%. Controller SEPA can provide rich services such as network application
authentication, authorization (fine-grained), information undisclosed, and network application
isolation. Furthermore, although several works have proposed to use permission set to secure
SDN controllers, they cannot detect the API abuse with static permission control. Hence,
our prototype II Controller DAC, enables the access control dynamic, i.e., the SE-layer can
detect the API abuse by accounting the network application operation. In this way, the SE-
layer can protect the SDN controller with AAA against the malicious operations from the
external APIs. We demonstrated that Controller DAC works well with OpenDaylight with low
deployment complexity. In particular, no modification of their source codes is required in their
implementation, while the overall security of the SDN controller can be significantly enhanced.
More than authentication, authorization, information undisclosed, and network application
isolation, the SE-layer prototype II Controller DAC secures the SDN controller with dynamic
access control with the performance overhead less than 0.5%. This SE-layer can hence enhance
the security of the SDN controller in an efficient way with the AAA control.

Chapter 4
Security Enhancing Architecture for SDN
The notion of the SDN paradigm is the bestowal of network decision control to a globally
intelligent view, hosted above the data plane. SDN enables this intelligence to be written in
software as network applications using open APIs to better facilitate agile development and
expedite network innovations. This is achieved by the SDN controller exposing the APIs to the
data plane and the application plane, which is necessary to facilitate a wide range of network
applications. Hence, the SDN controller offers a dramatic shift from the vendor specific
proprietary network infrastructure to an open architecture. The revolution provides network
application developers with programmable interfaces to manage the networking appliances on
the data plane. Unfortunately, problems arisen from network application flaws, vulnerabilities,
and malicious logic that may interfere with control layer operations have remained largely
unaddressed for current SDN controllers [130]. Even worse, the diversity of the SDN controllers
makes it harder to secure controllers from these malicious network applications [125]. As
network events are continuous, the northbound interfaces should be message-driven for ensuring
to process the network events in real-time. For this reason, the internal APIs like Java API and
Python API as the northbound interfaces are widely adapted for listening the network events,
i.e., OpenFlow messages, in the SDN architecture. But this design risks the controller from
being injected by the malicious network application because these APIs, so-called internal
APIs [39], cannot be decoupled from the controller. Although the northbound interface like
RESTful API can be used to decouple the network application from the controller, but it is
based on web service, i.e., server-client model, and does not support to listen the continuous
network events (not message-driven). If the network application over requests the network
events through the RESTful API, this will cause the network to suffer from a serious latency
even packets dropping [145].
In this chapter, we discuss how to secure network application deployment in SDN archi-
tecture. We propose a security-enhancing architecture for SDN, dubbed SENAD, for securing
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the network application deployment on the current SDN controller. SENAD architecture splits
the well-known SDN controller into: (1) a data plane controller (DPC), and (2) an application
plane controller (APC). The role of the DPC is dedicated for interpreting the network rules
into OpenFlow entries and maintaining the communication with the data plane. The role of
the APC is secured by design by providing the network applications authentication, access
control, resource isolation, and application monitoring. We show that this approach can easily
shield against the deny of service, caused by the resource exhaustion attack or the malicious
command injection. The evaluation of our architecture shows that the packet_in messages take
around 5 ms to be delivered from the data plane to the application plane on the long range. The
work scope of this chapter includes:
• We propose a novel SDN architecture SENAD to securely deploy the network application.
This architecture splits the SDN controller into (1) a data plane controller (DPC) and (2)
a application plane controller (APC), and then secures the APC by design. This split
will allow the DPC to only interpret the network rules into an OpenFlow entries and to
maintain the communication with the data plane. In the other hand, the APC will play
the role of a secured-by-design runtime to the network applications.
• We implemented the SENAD architecture based on the Floodlight controller and evaluated
the performance of the novel architecture, which shows the preliminary results that the
latency can be maintained under 5 milliseconds on the long range.
• We tested the feasibility of the SENAD architecture by deploying a network application
as priority-bypassing attack detector. In this test, the SENAD architecture shows high
compatibility with the current existing SDN controller (Floodlight).
4.1 Motivation
OpenFlow protocol, as one of the most popular SDN enablers, uses the "packet_in" message
to inform the SDN controller to process the unknown packets and enforce the routing rule. As
shown in Figure 4.1, once the data plane, i.e. OpenFlow switch, receives a new packets, OF
switch will pack it into packet_in message and send it to the controller. The SDN controller
will look for the business logic installed in the network application for enforcing the flow rules
in the data plane for processing this packet. The "packet_in" message is a way for the switch
to send a captured packet to the controller. There are two main reasons why the packet_in
message is generated: a miss in the match tables or a ttl error, which results in asking an
action to the controller for this packet. Hence, as the network packets are continuous, the
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Fig. 4.1 packet_in message processing in OpenFlow
detection of the packet_in message should be message-driven. But the current decomposable
northbound interface RESTful API (TCP/IP) is not message-driven. The controllers including
OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight and Ryu, hence adopt the internal APIs, i.e., native Java or
Python APIs, to listen to packet_in message.
Even worse, one of the root causes of the fragility of the controllers is their tight coupling
with applications. Thus, the effective approach is to separate the resource usage of controller
from the network applications. This can be done by the file system-based isolation [81],
process-based isolation [130] [106], or deploying a shim-layer [144]. We discuss more details
of these approaches as follows.
4.1.1 YANC file system
YANC [81], an SDN controller platform, adopts UNIX-like permission to separate network
applications from exposing the network configuration and stating it as a file system. In YANC,
network applications are separated by the UNIX-like file system from the SDN controller.
Applications benefiting from the virtual file system (VFS) layer used to distribute file system,
as well as the namespaces that are used to isolate applications with different views (e.g., slices).
The high-level view of YANC file system is presented in Figure 4.2.
4.1.2 Rosemary controller proposition
Shin et al. proposed a SDN controller Rosemary [130], which separates network application
from controller and each new network application in Rosemary is invoked as a new process.
Rosemary’s network application connects to the SDN controller process through the IPC (inter-
process communication). Moreover, Rosemary compartmentalizes controller’s kernel modules
by separating not only the network applications, but also the modules in the controller. Hence,
this design increases the robustness of a controller, because it only runs necessary services. The
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Fig. 4.2 YANC system architecture
services in the Rosemary kernel communicate with each other through an IPC channel, and
the implication is that if a service crashes, other services are immune to this crash. In contrast,
controllers such as Floodlight, NOX, and POX have implemented all necessary functions in a
single zone. Rosemary architecture overview is presented in Figure 4.3. Rosemary provides
diverse libraries for applications, and each application can choose necessary applications for
its operations and spawns a new process for avoiding malicious network application from
crashing controller unexpectedly. But this approach should develop a new security-driven
SDN controller besides the current existing controllers. Hence, Rosemary controller secure
the controller’s runtime based on process but without defining the access rights based on user,
application, and file on the system. For example, for hardening co-existing applications running
on Linux, SELinux even defines more fine-grained the access and transition rights of every
user, application, process, and file on the system [106]. Therefore, this motivates us to find a
solution which can be widely adopted by the current SDN controllers without high deployment
cost and complexity for hardening the SDN controller.
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Fig. 4.3 Rosemary controller architecture
4.1.3 System shim-layer isolation
The isolation mechanism used in [144] proposes a shim layer between the OS and the network
application to forbid the undesirable interaction between the applications and the OS. In order
to provide such isolation, PermOF proposes an isolation framework as depicted in Figure
4.4. In the proposed system, controller and applications are isolated in thread containers. On
one hand, applications are isolated from controller kernel and applications cannot call any
kernel procedures or directly refer to kernel memory. PermOF achieves it by carefully craft
the kernel code, so that applications are not able to obtain object reference from the kernel
memory. This shim layer should be configured and controlled by the controller kernel, so that
undesirable interaction between the applications and the controller’s runtime will be cut off.
This requires also to modify the dynamic library of the programming language or the OS. As to
do so, the code of the system which hosts the SDN controller should be modified, but there
is no real implementation for this shim layer in [144]. We cannot really estimate the cost and
the feasibility for implementing this SDN controller specific shim layer. Instead, we simplify
this work by putting the network application in a sandbox. Thank to the container technology,
this can be done by importing the container, e.g., Docker, which contains a component called
containerd-shim which sits between containerd and runC in Docker runtime for isolating the
network application from the OS resource.
4.2 Security issues of network application injection
Alough the work such as [98] and [100] proposes the principles for securing the SDN controller,
specifically the app-to-control threats. However, implementing these security principles remains
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still an unaddressed challenge. One of the main reasons is that the network event is continuously,
ie., the OpenFlow protocol uses the packet_in message to inform the controller of the network
event. However, the current most popular decomposable northbound interface is the RESTful
API, which is not message-driven but is based on the server-client model. Hence, mainstream
current controllers use internal APIs to listen to network events but this makes the controller
vulnerable to the malicious network injection [130]. We will discuss two threats due to the
network application injection in this section.
4.2.1 Resource exhaustion
The SDN controller functioning as a networking operating system allows the installation
of the networking application to smarten up the network. Unfortunately, SDN controllers
including OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight and Ryu, are monolithic, running all the networking
applications in a single process. In this case, a malicious network application can easily crash
the SDN controller by exhausting the resource of controller’s runtime. [130] chooses Floodlight
and OpenDaylight as the main target SDN controllers and runs a malicious code in the network
application on the SDN controller to evaluate the robustness and the security of the controller.
Floodlight Case Study This test application simply calls an exit or return (with exit())
function when Floodlight runs. Figure 4.5 shows the result: when a buggy application acci-
dentally calls an exit function, the Floodlight instance is also killed. Second test is that this
malicious application creates multiple memory objects for allocating memory space. The
Floodlight instance does not limit memory allocations by its applications, finally resulting in
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Fig. 4.5 Floodlight crash result
Fig. 4.6 Floodlight memory leakage result
the controller (technically, the JVM) crashing with an out of memory error as shown in Figure
4.6.
OpenDaylight Case Study As OpenDaylight is also Java-based, the case of crashing a
Java-based controller can be done by calling a system exit function. The test result is shown in
Figure 4.7. OpenDaylight has similar robustness issues to the Floodlight instance.
Hence, from the examples above, we saw that to crash a controller can be done by creating
multiple objects or running infinite loops, invoking the system-level function in the networking
application such as System.exit(0) in JVM to stop the SDN controller. Although Open-
Daylight and ONOS run in the OSGi container (karaf) to support the service dynamic import,
the controller and the application both run in the same process. Floodlight, as a Java applica-
tion, runs in a single process with multi-threading. The Ryu framework allows the network
application module to inject, but still in a single process in runtime. This kind of monolithic
system cannot be immune from these attacks. Rosemary [130] develops a multi-process SDN
controller for mitigating these problems. Rosemary spawns network applications independently
in a new process and also provides the services to control the resource usage of applications like
resource utilization monitoring and limitation and an application permission set. In contrast, we
propose an orchestrator to deploy the network application upon the existing SDN controllers
instead of developing a new one.
4.2.2 Configuration manipulation
Another security issue due to the malicious network injection is the configuration manipulation
of the SDN controller or other network applications. Generally, the request processing from the
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network application in the SDN controller (specifically, based on the OpenFlow protocol) can
be classified into three types of control: (i) symmetric control flow operations, (ii) asymmetric
control flow operations, and (iii) intra-controller control flow operations [127]. Hence, a
malicious application can interrupt the service chain as the data transfers between two network
applications [22]. Even more, a malicious application can manipulate the network configuration
via the built-in function provided by the SDN controller [126]. For example, ONOS allows
users to dynamically and programmatically configure various ONOS components via the built-
in function ComponentConfigService to enhance the configurability of ONOS. This feature
is especially useful when users need to adjust the properties of various ONOS components (e.g.,
threshold values, switches to enable certain features) to fulfill different network requirements.
Meanwhile, this feature introduces a new security threat to the control plane. If a malicious
logic changes this configuration, this will completely change the network behavior. Similarly, in
the SDN controller Floodlight, if a malicious application modifies the PACKET_OUT_ONLY
parameter value to be set true, the overall performance of the target network will become
degraded [126]. Obviously, several research works such as [144] [120] [70] [22] adopts the
application-based access control. Yet, the diversity of the SDN controllers makes this infeasible
for some projects [125]. For example, the permission control in [120] [70] are implemented
by assigning permission verification to the related functions. However, it may be infeasible to
secure the controller’s functions by modifying every function in the source codes. In the worst
scenario, it would need to scan all the related functions (methods). One example is that in order
to control the topology information, OperationCheckpoint needs to modify the codes of the two
methods: getAllSwitchMap and getLinks in two different classes Controller.java and
LinkDiscoverManager.java, respectively, since both of them provide the topology related
information in Floodlight. In some SDN controllers, like OpenDaylight and ONOS, it is very
hard to scan and find out all these related-methods and harden them. Hence, we adopt an
approach to centralize the access control in the orchestrator(Service Broker module) instead of
scanning the source codes for reducing the deploying complexity.
4.2.3 Threats from the external network application
Differing from the internal network application threats as discussing above, the external network
application is separated from the runtime of a SDN controller and communicates to each other
through network, such as RESTful APIs. However, as the network events are continuous,
if a network application intends to detect network events such as host migration or evaluate
QoS/QoE of a streaming data or provide real-time troubleshooting service etc, the RESTful
APIs cannot receive the network events in real-time unless it keeps requesting the control
plane to update events occurring in the network. However, the RESTful-based or RPC-based
4.3 Design principle of the SENAD architecture 85
Fig. 4.7 OpenDaylight crash result
application uses the server-client model to listen to the network events. This means the network
application needs to continuously call the SDN controller to obtain the network events in real
time. Unfortunately, the over request from the network application causes the controller to
overload, which increases the latency, and even drops packets in the data plane. Even worse,
the RESTful APIs can be manipulated to flush out or modify flow entries with higher priority
with lower priority flow entries in the case of poor access control [145]. Hence, implementing
the network application as the external instance can not mitigate the API abuse problem evoked
by the network application.
4.3 Design principle of the SENAD architecture
As we have discussed in Section 4.2, we aim to secure network applications deployment in a
generic approach for the current existing SDN controllers. We split the SDN controller into the
data plane controller (DPC) and the application plane controller (APC) as illustrated in Figure
4.8. The DPC is dedicated to communicating the data plane, interpreting the network rules to
OpenFlow entries, and exchanging data with the APC. The APC works as the runtime of the
network application with the security-by-design principle, including application authentication,
request authorization, and resource isolation, control and monitoring. In the following, we
will present the main components of the APC. The high-level view of the APC is illustrated in
Figure 4.9. In the following, we will discuss the main components of the SENAD architecture.
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Fig. 4.8 Standard SDN architecture versus SENAD SDN architecture
4.3.1 Controller agent
The controller agents are used for the interaction between the APC and the DPC. Instead of
the server-client model required by the RESTful APIs, we adopt the publish/subscribe model
based on message bus system. This system allows the controller agent in the DPC to push the
network events to the subscribers without waiting for the request from the network application.
The authorized network application can also publish the data to the DPC through the APC
agent. As we can configure to publish the network events immediately or set a buffer and
linger time based on message bus system, this enables the network application to become
decomposable from the runtime of a SDN controller and run in an application sandbox (Section
4.3.3). Furthermore, as the message bus system can push the network events in real time to
avoid the API abuse as discussed in Section 4.2.3.
4.3.2 Policy engine
The policy engine consists of high-level policies and a policy parser. Its purpose is to define
the resource control of each network application as well as the access control of the network
application from the high-level. The high-level policy can configure the resources such as CPU
number, memory, storage allocated to a network application. This information will be sent to
the resource allocator (Section 4.3.3) by the parser. The service permission configuration in
the high-level polices will be passed by the parser to the authorization module (Section 4.3.4).
In the high-level policy, we can define the access control for the data exchange between the
network applications and the controllers(DPC and APC), and the resource usage by the network
application. We provide a non-exclusive permission sets in Table 4.1 because the permission
design is outside scope of this work. More discussion of the permission set design can be found
specifically in the works [144], [70] and [22].
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Fig. 4.9 High-level view of the APC
The policy includes access to the service of each network application with the param-
eters readable services and writable services. The readable services indicate from which
service this application can receive the network events. If this application is allowed to send
data into a service, it should be identified in the writable service permission. The service
PacketInMsg, for instance, means the permission set for allowing network application to
receive the packet_in message. PacketOutMsg is used to authorize and send the packet_out
message. ProactiveFlowEntry is used to enforce the proactive flow entry, i.e., f low_mod
message in OpenFlow. ReactiveFlowEntry is used to insert the reactive flow entry via
packet_out message. DeviceInfo and LinkInfo provide the host information and switch con-
nection information respectively. Statistics permission is used to report the traffic passing
through an OpenFlow switch. Payload permission means to read the payload of a packet and
Configuration is used to configure the controller setting.
An example of high-level policy defined in YAML can be found in Figure 4.3.2. In the
policy example we can find the configuration of the resource usage of the network application.
For instance, the CPU configured as 0.2 means that it can be configured from a part of CPU
usage, e.g., 20% of CPU usage, to the full cores of the server. More than CPU resource
control, the memory usage and the networking to the controller’s host can be configured in the
high-level policy, i.e., memory and networking respectively. The networking false means that
this application cannot rout to the controller host by default and all the data exchange should
pass through the APC agent. In this configuration, network application app1 is authorized to
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Permission Service
READ/WRITE Hello
READ/WRITE Error
READ PacketIn
WRITE PacketOut
READ FlowRemoved
READ/WRITE DeviceInfo
READ/WRITE HostInfo
READ/WRITE ProactiveFlowEntry
READ/WRITE ReactiveFlowEntry
READ Statistics
READ Payload
READ/WRITE Configuration
Table 4.1 Non-exclusive permission sets for Authorization module
get the data from the services DeviceInfo, LinkInfo, Statistics, and ProactiveFlowEntry, and
can write new flow rule (ProactiveFlowEntry).
We define a non-exclusive access control list for SENAD architecture as it is out of scope
of this chapter. More discussions of permission set can be found in [144], [70] and [22]. For
example, FlowRemoved in Table 4.1 is sent to the controller by the switch when a flow entry
in a flow table is removed. It can happen when a timeout occurs, either due to inactivity or
hard timeout. An idle timeout happens when no packets are matched in a period of time.
A hard timeout happens when a certain period of time elapses, regardless of the number
of matching packets. DeviceInfo and LinkInfo provide the host information and switch
connection information respectively. Statistics reports the traffic passing through an OF
switch. Payload means to read the payload of a packet. Configuration is used to configure
the controller setting like determining how much of a packet will be shared with the controller
[3].
The access control configured in the SENAD architecture is dynamic, which means the
Authorization module can update the access control on the fly. Hence, the access control can
be managed in the SENAD architecture instead of scanning functions in the controller as [120]
proposes. As the permission sets are configured in this way, the access control can be dynamic
and interactive. This means the access control can be updated on the fly.
Furthermore, the RESTful API, based on web service, acts as a server to many clients.
Figure 4.11 shows the comparison of the data delivering system between web service-based
and message bus-based(or message queue) northbound interface. For the web service-based
northbound interface, each network application request should pass through to the controller,
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and then the controller queries the data base or requests the data plane to find the data. Even
the requests amongst the network applications, the request should pass through the controller.
This model increases the loading to process the unnecessary requests (the requests between two
network applications). In this model, if the server fails, the client must take the responsibility
to handle the error. Similarly when the server is working again, the client is responsible to
resend the request. If the server gives a response to the call and the client fails to receive the
request, then the operation is lost. In this case, it is easy for the client to lose some events
occurring in the network. Moreover, as it is hard to control the number of client calls on the
web service, a huge demand on one server at a given time can result in server shut down (i.e.,
the DoS/DDoS attack). Although we can expect an immediate response from the server, we still
handle asynchronous calls by using callback to request the service in some cases. A message
queue like RabbitMQ, ActiveMQ, or Apache Kafka, can have different and more fault-tolerant
results. If the server fails, the message persists in the queue (even in machine shutdown). When
the server is working again, the server receives the pending message. If the server gives a
response to the call and the client fails, the message also persists. For the message queue, we
can decide how many requests the server handles by avoiding over requests. Although the data
from the server is not synchronous as it is event-based API, we can still implement/simulate
synchronous calls by keeping the data in local cache. Moreover, the controller can be free
from the requests between the network applications as it can be done by the Service Broker to
mediate the requests in the application plane.
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Fig. 4.11 Web service-based vs message bus-based northbound interface
4.3.3 Application sandbox and resource allocator
Differing from the monolithic SDN controller, the network application is deployed in a sandbox,
which isolates the resources and process from the runtime of a SDN controller. The resource
allocator allocates the resource to the application sandbox based on the policy passed from
the policy engine. One or several business logics to manage the SDN-enabled network can be
deployed in a sandbox as the network application. The interaction between the applications or
between the controller and network application is also constrained by the policy defined in the
high-level policy (permission set), which is controlled by the APC agent with the authentication
and authorization modules (Section 4.3.4). Even more, the resource allocator provides the
resource usage monitoring service, which posts the three levels of resource usage on the
dashboard: (1) the system-level resource usage, (2)the JVM-level resource usage, and (3)the
application sandbox-level resource usage for detecting the DoS attack caused by the resource
exhaustion attack. The resource monitoring service is used to track and recognize consumption
patterns that may violate resource utilization policies imposed upon the application. The system-
level monitoring metric includes the totality of the controller process threads and priority,
CPU usage, memory usage, and network traffic (download/upload). The application-level
monitoring includes the allocation of CPUs, memory, and storage to the network application.
The JVM-level monitoring service reveals the Java-based controller, e.g., Floodlight, resource
consummation on the JVM runtime. This information should be kept traceable and updating
for detecting the abnormal operations from the network applications.
4.3.4 Authentication and Authorization modules
The APC agent is used to exchange data between the DPC and the network applications. As
every data exchange, including the exchange between the network applications and the exchange
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Fig. 4.12 YAML-based policy example for deployment in SENAD architecture
between a network application and DPC, should pass through the APC agent. In this case, the
APC agent co-works with the authentication module and the authorization module to provide
access control service. We adopt the password-based authentication and the authorization is
based on the rules parsed from the policy engine.
4.3.5 The workflow of SENAD architecture
The workflow of this architecture is summarized as the following:
• Define the high-level policy by the network administrator.
• The Parser will translate the high-level policy to Resource Allocator and the Authorization
modules.
• Resource allocator deploys the application in the sandbox under the constraint of policy.
• Controller APIs exchange the OpenFlow messages between the DPC and APC.
• Authorization module authorizes every message exchange between the DPC and APC.
Hence, the resource control is deployed by the resource allocator, which executes policy
passed from the parser and deploys the application sandbox with the configured rule. The
authentication and authorization modules collaborate with the APC controller agent to verify
every data request from DPC to APC.
4.4 Implementation
We implemented the prototype based on SENAD architecture with the SDN controller Floodlight.
The Floodlight controller here functions as the DPC in our architecture, and we adopt the
92 Security Enhancing Architecture for SDN
message bus system Apache Kafka to play the role as APC. Apache Kafka supports reading
and writing streams of data like a messaging system. The data publisher and the data subscriber
are called Kafka producer and Kafka consumer respectively. The Kafka producer generates
the data and then pushes it to the Kafka broker (instead of to consumer directly), and then the
broker sends the data to the data consumer. The Kafka producer and Kafka consumer exchange
the data by registering a common topic. This means only the producer and consumer who
share the same Kafka topic can exchange the data. In this case, the DPC agent is implemented
by a Kafka producer who pushes the data to the PacketInMsg topic and a Kafka consumer
who receives the data from the PacketOutMsg topic. The network application can register
the PacketInMsg topic as a data consumer for the receiving of the packet_in message. Once
the packet_in messages terminates the processing in the network application, the network
application can send the results, e.g., network rules, to the specified topics. For instance, if the
result is sent to the PacketOutMsg topic, the DPC will receive it and then interpret it into the
OpenFlow entry.
For authenticating and authorizing the data exchange, the truststore of Apache Kafka is
configured to authenticate and authorize the topic requested by a producer/consumer, i.e., the
network application in our case. The Kafka server will check the permissions of the consumer
and the producer to determine which one can read/write the data from a topic. In this case, only
the authorized service provider/receiver can push/fetch the data to/from the APC agent. The
rules in the authorization module is parsed from the high-level policy (Section 4.12). Figure
4.14(c) depicts the ACLs translated from the high-level policy to the truststore of Apache Kafka.
In this case, Figure 4.15 shows the access control of the APC agent. In our configuration, the
network application can only access to the service DeviceInfo but cannot read the controller
configuration (permission Configuration), so the application can receive the DeviceInfo service
data(source IP/MAC and destination IP/MAC), but is refused to connect to Configuration
service by replying UNKOWN TOPIC.
The configurations in the policy engine including CPU, memory, and storage will be parsed
to the resource allocator, which applies the resource allocation on the application sandbox.
The container technology is a merged paradigm for the service deployment such as Docker,
which uses cgroup (control group) and namespace in the Linux kernel-level to isolate the
resource of the container from the host. Hence, we leverage the Docker container as the
network application sandbox in the SENAD architecture. Apache Mesos uses Linux cgroups
to provide isolation for CPU, memory, I/O and file system and provides applications (e.g.,
Hadoop, Marathon, Kafka) with APIs for resource management. In this case, Apache Mesos
works as the resource allocator in collaborating with Marathon to control the resource usage
of the network application sandbox, i.e., Docker container. When the high-level policy is
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Prototype components Implementation
DPC Floodlight(v1.2)
DPC agent Kafka producer/consumer
APC agent Kafka broker
Authentication module Kafka truststore
Authorization module Kafka truststore
Resource allocator Marathon, Sigar
Application sandbox Docker container
High-level policy YAML
Parser Java application
Network simulator mininet
Table 4.2 Prototype implementation
written in YAML, the parser translates it in JSON for allowing Marathon to deploy the network
application in the sandbox(Docker) as depicted in Figure 4.14(b). Notably, the networking
option in the policy of Figure 4.14(a) is parsed as the firewall rules in the iptables to disable
the routing from the Docker container to the APC. The Java package Sigar is used to monitor
the resource usage, including CPU, memory, and traffic, of the network applications and post it
on the a Javascript-based dashboard to visualize the resource consuming. The components of
our prototype implementation are resumed in Table 4.2. More implementation details will be
explained as follows.
4.4.1 Controller agent
In an OpenFlow SDN, when a switch receives a packet on a port, it will try to match the
packet to a flow entry in the switch’s default flow table. If the switch cannot locate a flow
that matches the packet, it will by default send the packet to the controller as a packet_in for
closer inspection and processing. In Floodlight, we create a new module and override the
receive command to listen to the packet_in message with the API OFMessage.getType().
As shown in Figure 4.13, when this agent receives the packet_in message, it can process the
payload of this packet, including the layer two data like packet type Ethernet or ARP, layer
three data like IPv4 or IPv6, even the layer four type like TCP or UDP, and then sends to the
packet_in consumer(s). We implemented the controller agents by using Kafka producer and
Kafka consumer to send and receive messages respectively.
Apache Kafka is an open-source, distributed and real-time streaming data processing
platform developed by the Apache Software Foundation written in Scala and Java. It adopts the
publish/subscribe system to retrieve the records; in this respect, it is similar to a message queue
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Fig. 4.13 Code example for controller API agent implementation in Floodlight
messaging system. Kafka can run as a cluster on one or more servers. The Kafka cluster stores
streams of records in categories called topics. The service publisher and subscriber in Kafka
are called Producer and Consumer respectively.
• Kafka Producer allows an application to publish a stream of records to one or more
Kafka topics in the message broker. The service provider deployed in the network
application functions has the role of the Kafka producer to publish data to the topics in
service broker.
• Kafka Consumer allows an application to subscribe to one or more topics and fetch the
data from a Kafka message broker. Hence, the service receiver of a network application
acts similarly the role of a Kafka Consumer to obtain the updated data from the service
broker.
The advantages of choosing Kafka are (1) it uses the publisher/subscriber system. This
means it is a message-driven message bus system and can exchange the OpenFlow messages
in real time without request/reply model as server-client model. (2)Apache Kafka is based on
TCP. In this case, the network applications can be decoupled completely from the runtime of
the SDN controller and be deployed in a sandbox.
4.4.2 Policy Engine
The example of high-level policy in YAML is shown in Figure 4.12, which can configure the
resource control, access control and network routing. The resource control consists of CPU,
memory and storage. The access control is identified by the permission to write and read the
service provided by the SDN controller or the network application. The network routing is
blocked by default between the network application and the controller, i.e., networking:false in
policy. Figure 4.14 depicts the parser translating the high-level policy to the Resource Allocator
(Marathon) and Service Broker (Kafka) from the policy in Figure 4.12.
4.4 Implementation 95
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The resource control policy will be sent to the resource allocator in json format if Marathon
is used to deploy the network application. The parser needs to extract the access between
the services to the message broker of Kafka as ACLs (Access Control List). The options
networking will be passed into iptables as a rule to control the routing between the controller
and the network application. The role will be used in other network applications in case of of
the need to allocate the priority of flow entries.
4.4.3 Authentication and Authorization modules
The truststore of Apache Kafka is configured to authenticate the topic requested by a user, i.e.,
network application in our case. The Kafka server authenticates the network applications(password-
based) and checks the permissions of the consumer (service receiver) and the producer (service
provider) to decide which can read/write the data from a service topic. In this case, only the
service provider/receiver is authorized to register a service with the certificate can push/fetch
the data from the server. The service permission is centralized to configure in the Kafka’s
message broker, i.e., the APC agent in our implementation. The automatic topics creation
should be disabled so that the network application will not create a topic to send/receive data
without the validation of the Authorization module. Figure 4.15 shows the access control
authorized by the APC agent: (a) is the firewall rule configuration in the iptables of controller
host, which disables the native external API access (we configure the default port 8080 to
8082) but only opens the port 9092 for data exchange via the service broker(Kafka). Hence,
(b) shows that network application cannot access to the SDN controller through RESTful API
and always waits the response. The (c) is the data exchange through the APC agent. As in
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Fig. 4.15 Access control provided by the APC agent with Authorization module
our configuration, the network application can only access to the service DeviceInfo but
cannot read the controller configuration(permission Configuration), so that the application can
receive the DeviceInfo service data(source IP/MAC and destination IP/MAC), but is refused
to connect to Configuration service.
4.4.4 Resource Allocator and Application Sandbox
Container technology is a merged paradigm for the service deployment such as Docker, which
uses cgroup (control group) and namespace in Linux kernel-level for isolating the resource of
the application sandbox from the host. We test the effect of the same malicious application
running directly on the SDN controller and in a container. The application contains a malicious
loop, which keeps inserting data in a HashMap. Figure 4.16 shows that when this malicious
loop runs directly on the controller runtime (JVM for the controller Floodlight), the SDN
controller drops the packet until it cannot service the data plane (mininet) any more, i.e., drop
completely the packets that the controller receives. The memory of JVM is configured as 512M,
and the service is completely stopped after three minutes of launching the attack. Fortunately,
the runtime of network application sandbox, contains a component called containerd-shim
which sits between containerd and runC in Docker runtime for isolating the network application
from the OS resource. Hence, when the same codes runs on the sandbox generated by the
Policy Engine app1 (CPU 0.5 and 128 MB memory), the service provided by the controller to
the data plane can be delivered successfully without being affected as shown in Figure 4.17.
4.4.5 Resource monitoring dashboard
We developed a Java program based on Apache Mesos APIs( API /tasks.json) and Java library
Sigar for resource usage monitoring. We integrate the system-level monitoring results and
network application resource allocation in the dashboard of the SDN controller Floodlight
(/ui/index.html) that dynamically updates results. Figure 4.18 shows the three level resource
usage monitoring: (i)system-level, (ii)JVM-level(Floodlight is Java-based), and (iii)application-
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Fig. 4.16 Service delivering failure of the controller under attack
Fig. 4.17 Service delivering successfully of the controller with sandbox protection
level. The system-level results include the controller PID with priority on the operating system,
the treads running on the controller, the system CPU usage and user CPU usage, network
traffic(download/upload), and RAM usage. The difference between system CPU usage and
the user CPU usage is the time spent in user space or kernel space. User CPU time is time
spent on the processor running your program’s code (or code in libraries); system CPU time
is the time spent running code in the operating system kernel on your program’s behalf. The
JVM-level is the overall JVM memory allocation (Figure 4.18 (b)). The application-level is the
resource allocation(CPU, memory, and storage) to each network application deployed in the
sandbox(Docker here).
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Fig. 4.18 Resource usage monitoring dashboard of the SDN controller Floodlight
4.5 Network application deployment based on SENAD ar-
chitecture
We tested the effect of the same malicious Java-based application running directly on the SDN
controller and in a container. The application contains a malicious loop, which keeps inserting
data in a HashMap. Figure 4.16 shows that when this malicious loop runs directly on the
controller runtime (JVM for the controller Floodlight), the SDN controller drops the packet
until it cannot service the data plane (mininet) any more, i.e., drop completely the packets
that the controller receives. The memory of JVM is configured as 512M, and the service is
completely stopped after three minutes of launching the attack. Fortunately, when the same
codes run on the sandbox generated by the policy engine app1 (CPU 0.5 and 128 MB memory),
the service provided by the controller to the data plane can be delivered successfully without
being affected as shown in Figure 4.17.
Moreover, we implement a network application based on SENAD for evaluating its feasibil-
ity. We use this network application detect the priority-bypassing attack. For understanding the
priority-bypassing attack, we explain first the flow rule selection process in the OpenFlow-based
SDN, i.e., priority-based mechanism, and then exploit the vulnerabilities of this mechanism.
The attack is used to exploit the priority-based mechanism in OpenFlow is called "priority-
bypassing" attack in this thesis.
4.5.1 Introduction to priority-based mechanism in OpenFlow
The priority-based mechanism in OpenFlow is the flow rule selection process in an OpenFlow-
based SDN. As SDN decouples the control plane from the data plane and becomes an external
entity. The data plane consists of forwarding devices that perform a set of elementary operations.
The forwarding devices have well-defined instruction sets (e.g., flow rules) used to take actions
on the incoming packets (e.g., forward to specific ports, drop, forward to the controller, rewrite
some headers, etc). These instructions are defined by southbound interfaces, ie., OpenFlow in
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our use case, and are installed in the forwarding devices by the SDN controller. Forwarding
devices are programmed by control plane elements through well-defined southbound interface
embodiments.
The applications plane is the set network applications that leverage the functions offered
by the northbound interface to implement network control and operation logic in control
plane. The applications called network applications include the applications such as routing,
firewalls,load balancers, monitoring, and so forth. The policies are ultimately translated to
southbound-specific instructions that program the behavior of the forwarding devices. Despite
the great benefits of OpenFlow-based SDN, it introduces many technical challenges for the
rules applying such as policy conflict and policy inconsistency [109] [132] due to the set
attribute for actions. The security threat identified here is due to the priority attribute in
the flow rule. As a flow rule is broadly defined by a set of packet field values acting as a
match (filter) criterion and a set of actions (instructions). Packet match fields are extracted
from the packet. Packet match fields that are used for table lookups depend on the packet
type, and typically include various packet header fields, such as Ethernet source address, IPv4
destination address or ingress port etc. The packet is matched against the table and only the
highest priority flow entry that matches the packet must be selected. A flow rule selection
example is as following.
Example. Existing two rules R1 and R2 in controller.
• R1 : i f (src_ip= 10.0.0.1) A= drop, P= higher
• R2 : i f (src_mac= 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11) A= allow, P= lower
A and P mean action and priority respectively. The controller receives a packet_in message
from HostA. The configuration of HostA :
• IP= 10.0.0.1
• MAC = 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11
Once the SDN controller receives a packet_in message from HostA, the controller will
choose one rule to apply between R1 and R2, because the packet from HostA matches against at
the same time R1 and R2 (R1 matches against its IP and R2 matches against the MAC address).
But the two rules will execute two different actions, one is to drop the packet and another is
to allow the packet. The controller will apply R1 to the packet_in message for it has a higher
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priority than the other. This is the priority-based mechanism. The nature of this mechanism is
never changed from OpenFlow 1.0 1 to OpenFlow 1.5 2.
In OpenFlow 1.0, the header fields is 12-tuple; until OpenFlow 1.5, the header fields
becomes 44-tuple. Because of the popularity and success of OpenFlow, most of the SDN
controllers adopt it for southbound communication [101] [93] [35] [15] [95]. Under these
conditions, the priority-based mechanism becomes more vulnerable. We will conduct the threat
analysis in the next section.
4.5.2 Priority-bypassing attack
The northbound interface in SDN is still short of protocol to build up the communication
between control layer and the network applications in applications layer. For example, Phillip
Porras et al. proposed the role-based source authentication to recognize by default three
authorization roles among those agents that produce flow rule insertion requests [109]. The
first role is that of human administrators, whose rule insertion requests are assigned the
highest priority. Second, security applications are assigned a separate authorization role. Flow
insertion requests produced by security applications are assigned a flow rule priority below
that of administrator-defined flow rules. Finally, non-security-related network applications
are assigned the lowest priority. Roles are implemented through a digital signature scheme,
in which FortNOX is preconfigured with the public keys of various rule insertion sources. If
a legacy network application does not choose to sign its flow rules, those rules are assigned
the default role and priority of a standard OpenFlow application [109] [110]. This design for
assigning priority is legitimate. In order to enforce a flow rule in a current SDN controller,
such as Floodlight, OpenDayLight and ONOS, they allow the system administrator via curl,
a popular command-line tool for transferring data using various protocols, to interact with
the REST API and to insert the policies into controller through digesting the rules inserted,
remotely or locally, in the network apps with southbound interface OpenFlow [35] [101] [95].
We discuss about the security threat with this kind of usage scenario.
1Priority description OpenFlow 1.0: Packets are matched against flow entries based on prioritization. An entry
that specifies an exact match (i.e., it has no wildcards) is always the highest priority. All wildcard entries have a
priority associated with them. Higher priority entries must match before lower priority ones. If multiple entries
have the same priority, the switch is free to choose any ordering. Higher numbers have higher priorities.
2Priority description in OpenFlow 1.5: The packet is matched against the table and only the highest priority
flow entry that matches the packet must be selected. The counters associated with the selected flow entry must be
updated and the instruction set included in the selected flow entry must be applied. If there are multiple matching
flow entries with the same highest priority, the selected flow entry is explicitly undefined. This case can only arise
when a controller writer never sets the OFPFF_CHECK_OVERLAP bit on flow mod messages and adds overlapping
entries.
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Fig. 4.19 Priority-bypassing attack model
Moreover, network application which is provided by a third-party developer can be installed
on the applications plane. Most controllers encourage anyone who has an interest in this
area to implement a network application by releasing open APIs [35] [43] [101] [15] [93].
This trend can be seen in the industry; for example, a network application store that has
been launched by HP [5]. This makes it extremely difficult to verify the rules from network
applications, ultimately leading the priority-based mechanism harder to control. We test
the priority-bypassing attack in the controller Floodlight with the network configuration as
following.
Scenario 1: IP/MAC-passing and VLANs-crossing by priority-passing attack.
Figure 4.19 is the attack model and the notation is as following:
• C⇒ The SDN controller
• SW1⇒ OF switch 1
• SW2⇒ OF switch 2
• SW3⇒ OF switch 3
• H1⇒ Host 1(attacker), connecting with port2 of SW1
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H1 IP= 10.0.0.1
H2 IP= 10.0.0.2
H3 IP= 10.0.0.3
R1 if(src_ip=10.0.0.1, dst_ip= 10.0.0.2) A=drop P=higher
R2 if(src_ip=10.0.0.3, dst_ip= 10.0.0.2) A=allow P=lower
Table 4.3 Configurations for IP-passing attack
• H2⇒ Host 2(target), connecting with port2 of SW2
• H3⇒ Host 3 (the host mutated from attacker)
• R1⇒ A rule from administrator, with higher priority
• R2⇒ A malicious rule from attacker, with even the lowest priority
The configurations of each role in this scenario is shown in Table 4.3.
The attack can be launched as the following steps:
1. Add a new rule R2, through a compromised network app or a compromised host via
curl, even with a lowest priority, i.e., R2 : if( src_ip=10.0.0.3,dst_ip= 10.0.0.2) A=allow
P=lowest
2. The attacker modifies IP to 10.0.0.3(H3).
3. The attacker sent a packet from IP=10.0.0.3(H3) to IP=10.0.0.2(H2).
4. When the packet arrive the OF switch, it is a new and unknown packet and the switch
send to the controller for asking which rule to apply.
5. The controller search the rule from the highest priority to the lowest.
6. R1 doesn’t match against for the IP address was no longer 10.0.0.1(H1) but 10.0.0.3(H3).
The controller pass the request to the next rule.
7. R2 matches against this packet(IP=10.0.0.3) and be applied.
8. A packet_out message from controller to switch for applying R2 allows this packet(action
of R2 is allow).
9. This packet is sent to the destination H2.
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H1 MAC = 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11
H2 MAC = 22 : 22 : 22 : 22 : 22 : 22
H3 MAC = 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33
R1 if(src_mac= 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11)
A=drop P=higher
R2 if( src_mac= 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33)
A=allow P=lower
Table 4.4 Configurations for MAC-passing attack
H1 MAC = 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11
H2 MAC = 22 : 22 : 22 : 22 : 22 : 22, vlan= 2
H3 MAC = 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33
R1 if(MAC = 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11)
A=set_vlan_id=1 P=higher
R2 if( MAC = 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33)
A=set_vlan_id=2 P=lower
Table 4.5 Configurations for VLANs-crossing attack
This attack cannot be simply resolved by binding MAC or defining the white-list because the
attacker can launch the attack after the machine has been authenticated. For example, in Linux,
the attacker can use the command "ifconfig eth0 hw ether 02:01:02:03:04:08" to
modify theMAC address easily. The eth0 is name of the Ethernet card, the 02:01:02:03:04:08
is the new MAC address. The experiment proves that the attacker can pass the rules of higher
priority successfully by modifying the MAC address. Moreover, the attacker can launch the
attacker from the virtual machines, which have their own virtual IP addresses and virtual MAC
addresses, the MAC-binding rules cannot match against the packet_in message from these
virtual machines. In the scenario of modifying MAC address, the configurations for each role
is in Table 4.4.
The attack can be launched by following the same steps in the last scenario with the
configuration in Table 4.4. We successfully reach H2 by modifying the MAC from MAC =
11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 : 11 to 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 with the inserted lowest priority R2 from a
compromised host or malicious network app.
Another potential attack caused by priority-passing is to cross the VLANs. The configura-
tion for this network is in Table 4.5. H1 and H2 should not be in the same VLAN. H1 should be
in vlan1 but H2 in vlan2. The R2, which is the rule from the attacker, will set the packet from
MAC = 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 : 33 to vlan2, even it should belong to vlan1 because the packet in
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fact is from the H1. The attacker might cross any VLAN even to the sensitive ones in this way
3.
Scenario 2: DoS by egressing actions The priority-based problem can cause DoS by
following the same principle. R1 is the rule from administrator and R2 is the malicious rule.
In this scenario, the administrator allows the packet from H1 to H2 with R1, but the attacker
inserts a rule(R2).
• R1: if(src_ip = 10.0.0.1, dst_ip = 10.0.0.2) A=allow, P=higher
• R2: if(src_ip = 10.0.0.1, dst_ip = 10.0.0.2) A=set_src_ip = 11.0.0.1, P=lower
In OpenFlow, the action set for egress processing is initialized at the beginning of egress
processing with an output action for the current output port, whereas the action set for ingress
processing starts empty, i.e., in this scenario, the action of R2(lower priority) is executed firstly
and R1(higher priority) secondly for the action set is egress processing. The action of R2
set the source IP to another sub-network(11.0.0.0) and causes the communication to 10.0.0.0
break. We successfully interrupted the communication between two hosts by a rule with lowest
priority(0) in Floodlight, even the system administrator has defined a rule with highest priority
to allow the communication between these two hosts.
4.5.3 Priority-attack test on the SDN controller Floodlight
Here we describes how the attack affects the controller Floodlight. Figure 4.20(a) is the
configuration of attacker, which has original IP address 10.0.0.1 . In Figure 4.20(b), we can
see that the victim is configured as IP 10.0.0.2. The flow rule in Figure 4.20(c) defined by
the administrator, with high flow rule priority 3000, for dropping the packet with source IP
10.0.0.1(ipv4_src) to the destination with IP 10.0.0.2(ipv4_dst). Hence, the connection between
attacker and victim is always suspended (Figure 4.20(d)). Unfortunately, if the attacker inserts
a flow rule, even with low priority 10(Figure 4.21(d)). With this malicious rule, it allows the
packet from IP 10.0.0.123 (any non-existing IP or configuration) to the destination IP 10.0.0.2.
By following this, the attacker changes its IP (or any configuration to match this header in this
flow rule) to 10.0.0.123. As the attacker’s IP is no longer 10.0.0.1, so the adm-rule will not be
applied on the packets sent by the attacker; instead, the malicious-rule will applied on it. The
action defined in the malicious-rule is to output the packet, so we can find in Figure 4.21(e),
the connection between the attacker and victim is rebuilt.
3set_vlan_id in OpenFlow 1.0 or push-VLAN in OpenFlow 1.5
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Fig. 4.20 Initial configuration and connection before priority-bypassing attack
Fig. 4.21 Priority-bypassing attack success on the controller Floodlight
4.5.4 SENAD-based attack detector application
We use a machine with Intel i7 CPU and 16G memories as the testing platform. The attack
detector is deployed in a Docker container through Marathon framework as the framework
described in Section 4.4. The algorithm 1 is used to detect the malicious host migration as in
Scenario 1 IP-bypassing attack in Section 4.5.2. The detection process is as the following steps:
1. Get the flow rule list as l
2. Get the packet_in message
3. Update the device information with IP and Mac address pair
4. Replace the IP in header field in l with mac as new rule list l’
5. Check whether there is the same head field in l’
6. If find the same head field in l’, compare the action sets
7. If the action sets different but the priority the same, send a WARNING message
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Result: Return a new flow entry or warning message
while listen to packet_in message do
mapd ← device information with IP and Mac address mapping;
lo← original flow rule list;
ln← update flow rule list according to device information mapd ;
if more than two rules with the same head field but different actions in ln then
if the same priority then
send WARNING message;
else
update conflict rule;
end
else
do nothing
end
end
Algorithm 1: The algorithm to detect priority-bypassing attack
8. If the action sets different but the priority different, update the rule with the new attacker
configuration
Hence, Figure 4.22 shows how this detector works. Figure 4.22(a) is the attacker new
configuration and (b) the victim configuration. Without the attack detector, these configuration
allows the attacker to connect with the victim as we tested in Section 4.5.3. But the Figure
4.22(c) is the new rule generated automatically by the attack detector. Notably, the detector
updates the adm-rule automatically with the new attacker configuration (IP 10.0.0.123). Once
the new rule is enforced to the data plane, the malicious connection from the attacker will be
quarantined as shown in (d).
4.6 Performance evaluation
We evaluated the SENAD architecture performance in delivering the packet_in message re-
ceived by the controller Floodlight until it passes the message to the network application in
a sandbox(Docker) by progressively installing one network application to ten applications
running at the same time. The configuration of the network application sandbox is a CPU
of 0.2, a memory of 128 MB, and storage of 100 MB. The northbound processing time , i.e.,
latency, for delivering the message when the controller receives the packet_in message until
arriving at the network application is shown in Figure 4.23. The figure shows that the latency
can be kept under five milliseconds on the long range.
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Fig. 4.22 Priority-bypassing attack protection successfully by the message queue-based detector
4.7 Discussion
We discuss the related work of the priority-bypassing attack and detection here. VeriFlow
[23], FLOVER[134], NetPlumber[108], and FlowGuard [57] are real time policy verification
tools. VeriFlow proposes to slice the OpenFlow-based network into equivalence classes to
efficiently check for reachability violations. FLOVER checks the OpenFlow configuration for
security violations using Yices SMT solver. NetPlumber is a checking tool based on HSA that
utilizes a dependency graph between flow entries to incrementally check for loops, black holes,
and reachability properties. These work resolve the traditional network configuration issues
for the data plane of SDN. The priority-bypassing problem occurs more in the OpenFlow-
based SDN. VeriFlow and NetPlumber exist between the control layer and data plane layer.
Our solution(priority-bypassing detector as network application) resolves the problem in the
application layer. FlowGuard is a firewall framework which examines dynamic flow updates to
detect firewall policy violations. We implement our detector as a single network application for
easier deployment.
FlowChecker [50] and HSA [107] are off-line configuration analysis tools. FlowChecker
uses binary decision diagrams to test the configurations within a single flow table and uses
model checking to verify security properties. HSA verifies the data plane correctness by
modeling the network as a geometric model to discover reachability violations, forwarding
loops, and traffic isolation. Anteater [53] offers a static analysis approach to diagnose network
configuration problems. NICE tool applies model checking to explore the state space of the
entire system — the controller, the switches, and the hosts with symbolic execution of event
handlers. In general, these works take several seconds or a few hours to run. Our attack detector
can find the attack in real-time as the proposed northbound interface supports event-driven.
FortNOX and SE-Floodlight resolve the policy conflict caused by the set action of Open-
Flow in the control layer. Instead, we point out the vulnerability of the priority field in the
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Fig. 4.23 SENAD architecture packet_in message delivering time
flow rule and resolves the policy conflict caused by priority-passing of OpenFlow. FlowTags
is used to verify the policies inconsistency among the network applications; however, the
priority-passing attack is a security problem rather than priority field in the flow rule [132] as
the attacker can modify the self-configuration crossing different layers.
In the Policy Engine, the approle field is used for allocating the priority field in the flow
rule. This can be our future work to optimize the priority allocation amongst different the
network applications. We attempt also to improve the performance of the message queue-based
northbound interface with unikernel system, technically speaking OSv or Rumprun, to allow
the message broker to execute in the system kernel-level without passing through all the OS
stack.
4.8 Conclusion
This work attempts to provide a secure network application deployment architecture for SDN.
We propose the novel SDN architecture, SENAD, to deploy network applications. This architec-
ture adopts a the message bus system as the northbound interface for delivering the OpenFlow
messages from the data plane to the network applications in real time. The network administra-
tor fist defines the high-level policies in the Policy Engine, and then the Parser will translate
these policies to the Resource Allocator, the Authentication Module and the Authorization
module. Based on the policies, the Resource Allocator allocates the resources of the application
sandbox to separate the resources of each network application from the controller’s runtime.
The Authentication Module and Authorization Module will authenticate and authorize the
message exchange between the APC and DPC. The preliminary results show that this approach
can protect the controller against the DoS attack caused by the resource exhaustion attack,
command injection, code injection, and illegal service calling. Furthermore, we implemented
a network application in SENAD architecture to detect the priority-bypassing attack, which
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is a security issue of the priority-based mechanism in OpenFlow and causes the rule-based
policies fail, including IP-passing, MAC-passing, VLANs-crossing as well as DoS. With the
increase of the header fields in OpenFlow, it gives attackers more opportunities to launch this
attack; hence, this attack deserves careful attention. The preliminary result proves that the
SENAD architecture can be used to deploy the network application in the current existing SDN
controller and then detect the malicious host migration or flow rule enforcement. On the long
range, the latency of this architecture keeps around 5 ms for delivering the packet_in message
from the data plane to the network application.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we conduct a SDN controller specific security analysis for exploiting the vul-
nerabilities of the SDN controller. By following this analysis, we found one of the major
security issues in SDN architecture is the malicious network application injection. For this
reason, we propose a security-enhancing layer (SE-layer) with two prototypes (prototype I
Controller SEPA and prototype II Controller DAC) to secure the data exchange between the
network applications and the SDN controller through the external APIs. More than providing
the AAA control, this approach is controller-independent, that means this SE-layer can be
applied to the SDN controllers including Floodlight, OpenDaylight, ONOS and Ryu with less
than 0.5% performance overheads. A network secure architecture for application deployment
is also introduced to protect the SDN controller against the DoS attack caused by resource
exhaustion attack or malicious command injection through the internal APIs.
3D approach analysis on the security of the SDN controller. The 3-dimensional is
to evaluate the security of the SDN controller. In this work, we conduct a 3-dimensional
controller specific security analysis and resume the nine security principles identified from
the listed attacks. The three dimensions are the essential components of a SDN controller, the
characteristics provided by the controller and the Microsoft STRIDE model. We conclude that
the southbound interface, the northbound interface and core services are the three weakest
components of the SDN controller. The southbound interface suffers from the data-to-control
spoofing packets and flow flooding. Attackers tamper core services of the controller via
the northbound interface. The characteristics centralization and off-the-shelf make the SDN
controller vulnerable from DoS and elevation of privileges(mainly due to the injection of
malicious application to the controller’s run-time) respectively. Moreover, the SDN controllers
lack still the security mechanisms like connection verification, application-based access control,
and data-to-control traffic control. Finally, we resume 9 security principles for the SDN
controller and check the security of the current SDN controllers with these principles. We
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found that the SDN controllers ONOS and OpenContrail which show relatively more secure
than the others according to our analysis methodology.
The security-enhancing layer. The security-enhancing layer exists between the control
plane and the application plane. We address the app-to-control security issues with focus on
five main attack vectors: data tampering, illegal function calling, malicious scanning, and API
abuse. Based on the identified threat models, we develop a light-weight plug-in, which is called
Controller SEPA, by using RESTful API to defend SDN controller against malicious network
application operations. Specifically, Controller SEPA, a controller-independent SE-layer, can
provide the services including network application authentication, authorization, isolation, and
information protection. Unlike OpenDaylight and ONOS which offer user-based or role-based
coarse-grained access control, Controller SEPA provide a more fine-grained access control.
The preliminary results show that Controller SEPA create negligible latency (0.1% to 0.3%).
Furthermore, we exploit the vulnerability of the static permission control to the SDN controller
with the four permission categories: READ, ADD, UPDATE and REMOVE on four open
source SDN controllers, including OpenDaylight, ONOS, Floodlight, and Ryu. We found that
malicious network application still can infect the SDN controllers which are even hardened
by the static permission control. Therefore, we extend this SE-layer prototype I (Controller
SEPA) to prototype II Controller DAC, which can protect the SDN controller against the API
abuse of the network application with Dynamic Access Control System. In our implementation,
Controller DAC requires low deployment complexity as Controller SEPA for securing SDN
controllers, and most of time its operation is independent from the underlying SDN controller.
The preliminary experimental results show that Controller DAC can prevent SDN controllers
from API abuse through external APIs with less than 0.5% performance overhead. Hence,
this SE-layer generates a low performance overhead on the SDN controller but the overall
controller’s security has been enhanced with low deployment complexity.
SENAD: The security-enhancing architecture. The SENAD architecture addresses the
attacks through the internal APIs, such as DoS caused by the resource exhaustion attack or
malicious command injection. This architecture split the SDN controller in (1) the data plane
controller (DPC) and (2) the application plane controller (APC) and adopts the message bus
system as the northbound interface for delivering the OpenFlow messages from the data plane
to the network applications in real time. The DPC is dedicated to communicate the date
plane and interpret the OpenFlow messages and the APC is secured by design for installing
the third party network applications. The network administrator fist defines the high-level
policies in the Policy Engine, and then the Parser will translate these policies to the Resource
Allocator, the Authentication Module and the Authorization module. Based on the policies, the
Resource Allocator allocates the resources of the application sandbox to separate the resources
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of each network application from the controller’s runtime. The Authentication Module and
Authorization Module will authenticate and authorize the message exchange between the APC
and DPC. Additionally, for testing this novel architecture, we exploited an attack, called the
priority-bypassing attack, due to the priority-based mechanism in the OpenFlow-based SDN.
This attack can insert the malicious rules with lowest priority to manipulate the entire SDN
network and make all the rules with higher priorities fail. Hence, we deployed a network
application based on the SENAD architecture to detect the priority-bypassing attack and update
the rule automatically once the attack is found. On the long range, the OpenFlow packet_in
message processing time in the SENAD architecture can be maintained around 5 ms.
Perspectives. The SE-layer prototype I Controller SEPA is used to authorize the request of
the network application via the external APIs. The prototype II Controller DAC even accounts
the malicious request. However, determining a real malicious request is a non-trivial work
because some over requests may be caused just by human operation error. The over strict
verification on the requests may generate the false positive signals. In this case, a smarter
algorithm implemented with artificial intelligence could be applied to improve the detection
of the API abuse attack. As the internal northbound interfaces bring the security issues such
as malicious code injection or resource exhaustion attack, this motivates us to propose a new
SDN architecture by replacing the northbound interfaces between the network applications and
the SDN controller by the message bus system, a real-time and message-driven system. As
discussed in Chapter 4, we split the SDN controller in DPC and APC, and then secure the APC
by design for protecting against the malicious application injection and provide the real-time
message service to the network applications. However, the processing time in the Figure 4.23
is non-linear (Zig-Zag). The non-linear results are because we configure a buffer space (16
bytes) and linger time (1 millisecond) for increasing the throughput of the Kafka producer. The
zero buffer space and zero linger time can reduce the latency; however, the throughput will
be compromised. The high scalability provided by the message bus allows us to deploy the
network service flexibly in the SDN-enabled network. Hence, the performance tuning, i.e.,
optimizing the latency and the throughput with different network service deployment, would
be our future work when using the message bus system in the SDN architecture. Even more,
unikernel as an emerging technologies by providing a lighter approach to isolate the network
application runs directly on a hypervisor or hardware without an intervening OS such as Linux
or Windows [2]. This approach can avoid the attacker to attack the SDN controller through the
vulnerabilities or bugs from the host of a SDN controller. Hence, unikernel could be one of
possibility to securely deploy the network applications in the SDN architecture. The study and
test for the feasibility of a unikernel-enabled SDN could be one of our future works.
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